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Soros Gives $15 Million for Balkan Refugees

LD2009164495 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1547 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Sam Parkhouse, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] One of the world's most famous businessmen, George Soros, today gave 15 million U.S. dollars to help the plight of refugees in the Balkans.

Mr Soros, at a press conference in London, announced what is the biggest ever charitable donation towards those people involved in the crisis.

Mr Soros, who sprang to fame amid the currency crisis surrounding the British Government in 1992, said he felt great concern for the tragedy in Yugoslavia.

He said he was especially concerned for the tens of thousands of refugee children.

The billionaire businessman pledged the money in a two-year programme.

He has entrusted his Soros Yugoslavia Foundation to handle the nuts and bolts of the aid programme.

Mr Soros emphasised that the focus of the aid should be on the support of the children's education, including clothing, food and health care.

"By this donation I want to show that I do not hate Serbian people."

Clinton Politely Declines Berisha Invitation

AU2009142695 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 19 Aug 95 p 3

[Unattributed Report: "Clinton Declined His Invitation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, President Berisha gave a news conference on his visit in the United States. This conference made the president's staff compile a special list of the press to participate. The special list excluded all independent and opposition newspapers. Among the official press an invitation was extended only to the newspaper REPUBLIKA.

Under these conditions the conference did not bring anything new, but reiterated what the official media had broadcast during his visit. Nevertheless, the Albanian president spoke openly to the media. He informed the journalists of the invitation he extended to the U.S. President. Clinton replied to the invitation almost negatively when he said that he will consider the possibility of coming to Albania. He did not foresee a precise time, making us think that his refusal was very civilized. In fact, the United States will soon start its election year, and Clinton cannot spend his time visiting a country that yields so very few votes for him. Most likely his visit will become possible after the October 1996 elections, when the election campaign is over.

Growing Cooperation With U.S. Considered 'Vital'

AU2009142495 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed Commentary: "Again Noise..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The propaganda of the party in power, as expected, at the inspiration of its leader, President of the Republic Sali Berisha, has been totally mobilized to present his visit in the United States as an extraordinary visit of the Democratic Party [PD]. Berisha took the same stand in yesterday's news conference. It is common knowledge that no one, either in Albania or abroad, believes this. The factor that paved the way to a close cooperation between little Albania and the biggest democratic country in the world is the triumph of democracy, and not personal involvement or the coming to power of a political party, be it the Democratic Party. President Berisha and the PD behave like this because they want to retain the monopoly of democracy, though in all their practical activity they are working contrary to this aspiration. They think that the opposition must stay put, because allegedly Berisha and the PD know everything better. The high tones they use to oppose any other view, be it the opinion of another political party or of a politician who is not a PD member, are an exrpesssion of monist practices, the spirit of decree and attempts to strangle all other alternatives. These acts do not give credit to their authors.

This is the reason why Berisha had hardly returned from his visit to the United States when the propaganda of the party in power tried by all means to present the Socialist Party not only as an anti-American force, but also as opposing this visit. The PD forgets that the Socialist Party greeted this visit and did it for the sake of the lofty interests of Abania and the strengthening of the Albanian-American cooperation, and not to please Berisha or draw some political profit from this stand.

We consider the growing Albanian-American cooperation in all fields as a vital demand for the development of democracy and progress in Albania. In this prism, we rejoice over all the positive moves which serve our national interests, just as we think valuable the remarks we can make on several issues, in the service of this great objective. The authors of the antisocialist propaganda who are trying by all means to alienate us from everybody, forget that pluralistic democracy makes constructive opposition a must. The opposition role can only be played by a strong, clear-headed opponent, and not by a servile, mediocre one.

U.S. Delegation Visits Five Political Parties

AU2009142595 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by E.A.: "We Do Not Support Parties, We Support Democracy"]

[FBIS Translation Text] Yesterday, a delegation of the Internatonal Republican Institute for Central and East Europe, met with five Albanian political parties. They started the visit with the Democratic Party [PD]. They met with the general secretary, Mr. Tritan Shehu. The delegation led by the director of the Institute, Ms. Clair Secler [as published], was interested in the political situation in Albania and the coming elections. Members of the delegation were Peter Dickinson, Thomas Peterson, and Randy Siefkin [as published]. They have been following developments in Albania for a long time. Mr. Dickinson told POPULLI PO that their purpose is to know the situation in Albania.

According to the Democratic Party spokesman, the American friends, in their meeting with Mr. Shehu, became acquainted with the political situation in Albania, the achievements of the Democratic Party in recent years, and the renovation of all PD structures at the grass roots. Shehu also spoke about the visit of President Berisha in the United States and said that it was "an expression of the further strengthening of very good relations between Albania and the United States."

Shehu considered the support of the International Republican Institute very valuable. "We are sure that in the future, too, support will continue for the benefit of democracy in Albania so that incorrigible communists do not return to power," Shehu concluded. According to the spokesman of this party, the American friends expressed their readiness to help the PD even more during the 1996 elections.

After the PD, the American friends visited the Democratic Alliance and met with the president of the party, Mr. Neritan Ceka. Besides the coming election campaign and the political situation, the Americans asked Ceka about the differences between his party and the PD. "We do not attack courts, are not involved in oil and arms trafficking, and do not receive bribes. This is what divides us from the PD," he replied.

The meeting with Gjinushi at the Social Democratic Party seat followed the meeting at the Democratic Alliance. There was nothing unusual at the meeting. The American friends were interested in the political situation as seen from the viewpoint of the Social Democrat leader and the situation of the central left party. Later Dokle, Socialist Party deputy chairman, had a one-hour talk with the American Republicans, who asked about the percentage of votes the PS might win in the coming elections. "We will win," replied the PS deputy chairman. "In the referendum Berisha stole 100,000 votes; in the elections he will steal 200,000 votes, but we will win," continued the Socialist leader. "Let Berisha try as hard as he can. Let him concoct as many laws against the Socialist Party as he likes. Let him concoct as many laws against Fatos Nano as he likes, the PS will win the electons," continues Dokle, expressing his resoluteness to POPULLI PO. "Let him issue three times as many laws of the referendum type, we will win," he concludes. At about 3 pm the American friends went to the Republican Party seat where they met with Deputy Chairman Mediu. After their visits, Mr. Dickinson said to POPULLI PO that their visit was informative. Mr. Dickinson did not express an opinion on who would win the election. "We do not support any party, we support democracy," he told POPULLI PO. On behalf of his group he assessed the visit of the Albanian president in the United States: "Relations between the two countries are very positive," he said.

Reaction to U.S. Senator's Warning on Socialism

AU2009142295 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by E.A.: The American Senator: "Albania Should Not Become Socialist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Congressman Engle told President Berisha that Albania should not become socialist. This statement brought reaction from Albanian leaders. Ceka [Democratic Alliance chairman] and Dokle [Socialist Party deputy chairman] are against speculation with such a statement. "This is a lecture for idiots because the American congressman does not allude to parties, but systems" says Ceka, thus helping the Socialist Party. "He knows that socialism died once and for all as a system in Albania, and it has no future and no ties with the legal party," continues the top man of the Democratic Alliance.

Ceka is the first among right-wing politicians to accept the reformation of the Socialist Party. Until now, none of them has accepted its reformation. "I don't want Albania to become communist," says Ceka defending his idea. "Albania may become socialist by the party that bears this name, as the sister parties made Italy or France," Ceka concludes.

Meanwhile, Dokle emphasizes this idea. "If he means Enver Hoxha's socialism, when Berisha was a doctor of the political bureau, we too, do not like it," says Dokle. "We all like the European, French, Spanish, British, Swedish, Norwegian and other socialisms, and we will build this democratic socialism or social democracy," continues the socialist leader. But he is sure that the American congressman means the Eastern socialism of the Cold War. "Surely he means the Eastern socialism which will never win in Albania, but the Socialist Party, which is a party of the European social democratic type, will win in the coming elections," Dokle continues. Thus the two opposition leaders are trying to throw light on the statement by the American congressman, who according to them, did not mean any party. Dokle persists in his belief in the victory of his party despite the pressure of state power. "With rallies or not, we will win," Dokle concludes.

Comments From PSD Chairman

AU2009142395 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by A.S.: "Gjinushi: 'Other Congressmen Do Not Like the Democratic Party'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The socialists have heard the declaration by the American congressman and they are worried. Not very worried though. Bashkim Zeneli, Socialist Party deputy, says only, "I do not know this congressman." There is less concern in the Social Democratic headquarters. "He did not mean European socialism, or to be more precise, social democracy," says the Social Democratic Party [PSD] chairman Skender Gjinushi. Congressman Engle in his informal meeting with the Albanian president told him: "We do not want Albania to become socialist." According to Gjinushi he meant the former socialism. "Anyway this means nothing. There might be many other congressmen who are against the Democratic Party. They can even declare that there is no true democracy in Albania for as long as there is the Democratic Party. Others might express their preferences for the Social Democratic Party. All these are only preferences," he says.

When it is about preferences, the Social Democrat expresses his or his party's preferences. Analysing Engle's declaration against the Socialist Party he says, "We, too, are not for a victory of the Socialist Party which would replace the Democratic Party. This has also been one of our objectives ever since the last elections. On the contrary, we are for an equilibrium in Albanian politics, an increase in social democracy, and the strengthening of the parties that are closer to European democracy, such as our party and its youth are. We are even for the Eurosocialist Youth Forum that has won status and credibility that are different from that of its Socialist Party." According to Gjinushi, these are the most real, stable forces in Albania which are free from the danger of bringing former socialism back, which "this or some other congressman did not like." At present, even the Socialist Party is aspiring toward social democracy.

According to the center left leader, many people consider the victory of the Socialist Party with reserve. One of them is the Social Democratic Party. "This does not mean that the United States will divide Albania again into the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party," says Gjinushi. "It is a grave mistake to pin hopes on only one party." At the beginning, the Democratic Party was the only anticommunist front, or the dominant force. Now it is not the only one to guarantee the progress of reforms. The Democratic Party's policy is much like that of the Party of Labour. Gjinushi has hopes for the nonradical center.

Commentary Assesses Berisha's Electoral Strategy

AU1909200895 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 17 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Y. Polovina: "Nine Berisha Impacts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is clearly seen that the Democratic Party (PD) and especially its leader Sali Berisha, are preparing themselves seriously for the electoral confrontation. Nothing can be said for sure whether a special "commission" has been set up on purpose, but everything appears to be studied in detail.

Hypothetically, this plan of action can be divided into nine "impacts." We define them as "impacts" because the nature of Berisha's political struggle relies on the element of force and frontal attack. Mr. Berisha uses very few traps, behind-the-back acts or gnawing-from-within techniques. His style of attack, the so-called hard policy has yielded its results: All the Albanian political forces are against him now, and he has blown up all bridges for alliances with them. Most likely the nine impacts of the electoral campaign will worsen the results.

First Impact: Eduard Selami's gradual removal from his party, legislature functions, and later his exclusion from the list of deputies and the National Council. PD's cleansing is considered completed technically in the leading branch structures. The interviews the newly elected PD branch chairmen are giving to RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE prove that they are totally pro-Berisha. The cleansing of Selami supporters from the National Council, if faced with some resistance, will be carried out through pressure, something which was seen in Hajdari's case. Selami himself felt this process and he remained totally inactive.

Second Impact: Attack against any possibility for Fatos Nano to come out of Benca [area of the prison]. Leaving the Socialist Party without its chairman and encouraging the ideological divergences that are very personal among its leaders, it can cause the "big bang" effect, the destruction of a party from within. It is common knowledge that political parties can be split. The presidential anger against the "Nano case," despite its international nature, fluctuates between releasing a humiliating pardon decree and paying any price for his rival not to enjoy the electoral campaign next spring. The attack against Nano appears to have special priority.

Third Impact: Quite unexpected and at a very ruinous cost: the elimination of Zef Brozi. This emergency has numbed the brains of the present state power. Everything could be used to eliminate Brozi. The alienation of the executive power is so unrestrained that even Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, who is not considered very policelike, thinks it is justifiable for the police not to allow an employee to enter a legal office, who only 24 hours ago was dismissed by a dubious order. Brozi's elimination is immediate, a high-risk alert. Legal power must be completely subjugated, and people like Gjata, Constitutional Court chairman, and Attorney General Prela should stay in the office.

But Zef Brozi is Zef Brozi. Very "obstinate." There is no politician in Albania who realized what he has. Until now there has been no one who is as determined. In their belligerent characters they are either two Berishas or two Brozis. [as published]

Fourth Impact: It started in summer and will continue through to three other seasons: In key administration jobs, banks, public order, the Army, the Foreign Ministry, the Albanian Information Service, and radio and television only those will work who are ready to use the state institution in favor of the electoral victory of the Democratic Party.

Fifth Impact: The Legislature's announcement of the struggle against communist genocide. In principle, a legal act, initiated in several other former bolshevik countries. In the Albanian case, it was postponed and is being used as an electoral instrument. There is no doubt that a normal law on genocide, will be used by the present government under PD's total command. It will be spearheaded only against the political adversaries next spring. No one bothers about real genocide.

Sixth Impact: Screening of files, as near the elections as possible. It must have a traumatic, quick effect, without leaving much time for thinking whether this or that name is forged, this or that file is manipulated, and this or that picture of someone in military attire shows that that person is a former secret police or doing some military training, where people only sat under the shadow and did nothing else.

Seventh Impact: A hasty law on electronic media, at the very last moment. This must also be shocking, so that the opposition has no time to counteract. Leka Bungo, one of the most dexterous in the electronic political struggle, is director of the International Center of Culture, and he has declared that he will transform it into a National Center and a center for a television channel. From the luxurious halls of former Enver Hoxha museum, a double propaganda impact is expected to start against the Socialist Party (and in Tirana also against the Democratic Alliance).

Eighth Impact: It is the only "soft" one: Salaries will increase at least two times, vouchers will be distributed quickly, remunerations will be distributed by all institutions, public property will be divided...

Ninth Impact: It is enigmatic. It is common knowledge that it will be preceded by an "electoral convoy" of the president in all the cities of Albania. The entire theatrical arsenal of PD's politics will be used. But the election night, the central commission, the results to be announced, will probably contain the ninth impact, the final impact. Or the fatal impact. Whether it will be "hard" or "soft" should not be decided now.

G-7 Calls For Closure of Kozloduy First Reactor

AU2109104895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 21 Sep 95

[Report by Kalina Stancheva]

[FBIS Translated Text] An important and serious meeting took place before today's cabinet meeting. The ambassadors of Canada, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, and EU Ambassador O'Sullivan visited Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev.

In the presence of leaders of the Committee on Power Supply and the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, their excellencies, the G-7 ambassadors, handed Mr. Tsochev a political note on the state of the first reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. According to the information the G-7 has, the first reactor represents a nuclear safety threat in the region.

In a statement after the meeting, Mr. Tsochev said that the information the G-7 has is based on surveys made in 1989. These surveys have been waved in front of our faces for several years. We have presented enough evidence about the real technical situation of the first reactor, which has been loaded with nuclear fuel and is ready to be restarted at its 440-megawatt capacity. What we are being asked to do now is to conduct tests that will last months. At the end of these tests we will have the same results we already have. As a scientific experiment this is senseless, Mr. Tsochev said. By no means will we place the region in any nuclear danger, but everything must take place in a calm and smooth manner, without any pressure.

For his part, Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, who has just returned from the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] General Conference in Vienna, said that the evidence on the state of the first reactor structure provided by three Bulgarian institutes and one Russian institute and by the plant manufacturer permits us confidently to conclude that the first reactor can be freely restarted during the autumn season.

The appropriate decision will be taken after the relevant inspection, which will begin on Monday, and will last about one week. During the inspection the experts will check not only the structure, but also all the systems of the first reactor.

Russian Deputies Demand Lifting of FRY Embargo

BR2009133395 Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 Sep 95 p 33

[Article by Rafael Alvarado: "Russians Pressurizing Bulgarians Into Lifting Embargo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—During the meeting between a group of Russian deputies and the Bulgarian National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, the visitors arrogantly demanded that Bulgaria unilaterally lift the embargo on the former Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY]—for the sake of "Slavic solidarity," they said—and give Russia a humanitarian and military corridor so that Moscow can access Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

The Russian deputies, who had recently met with [Bosnian Serb leader] Radovan Karadzic in Banja Luka, said they had proof that behind the veil of humanitarian aid, the United States was supplying weapons to the "Muslim-Croat Federation"—a term which the Russian deputies were keen to stress—and is one reason why Russia cannot simply stand by and watch for very much longer.

When the Bulgarian National Assembly Committee unanimously refused, since Bulgaria has repeatedly claimed its neutrality in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Russian deputies forgot their good manners.

In threatening terms reminiscent of the way the former Soviet Union used to impose its will on its satellite countries, they said that "Europe must not forget that the gas it uses comes from Russia, and if it has forgotten this fact, then we will see to it that it will be brought to its attention."

They immediately went on to say that if Bulgaria continued to refuse Russia's demand "then we will draw the relevant conclusions and we will ask the Russian oil and gas companies to do likewise."

The Russian deputies concluded sharply that whenever Russia has felt itself obliged to defend its interests in the Balkans it has always come down on the side of the Serbs, which means, in effect, against Bulgaria.

These statements made in Sofia coincided with the visit to Moscow of Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov.

Videnov met with Victor Chernomyrdin to finalize details of the agreement between Bulgaria, Russia, and Greece for the new oil pipeline linking the Bulgarian port of Burgas in the Black Sea to Alexandroupolis in Greece. This would avoid having to go via the Bosphorus which would require Turkey's authorization.

Videnov's Moscow Visit Should Improve Trade Ties

AU2109091295 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Sep 95 p 6

[Commentary by Nikola Kolev: "Taste of Realism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While it might still be too early to say, it appears that the outcome of Prime Minister Zhan Videnov's visit to Moscow has the taste of realism, if only because it reflects a basic change in the xenophobic feelings at the political level regarding the economy, and it indicates that there is a good chance for the Bulgarian state and private business.

The initial euphoria during the transition period and the postsocialist countries' mass orientation toward the west rapidly produced irreparable damage. That is why clearheaded people constantly insisted that every breakthrough on every possible market and every expansion of foreign trade could be invaluable for our ailing production structures. This applies especially to Russia, which for a long time will be the basic source of our power supply.

The private companies were the first to realize this. They rapidly filled the vacuum created in the eastern markets, and now they are prepared to be equal partners of the state structures. In the complicated political situation, however, they were treated in the same way as companies of more developed countries. Now the promise to give them preferential treatment could encourage a rapid development that could help to equalize our very negative trade balance with Russia.

None of this should be regarded as a change in our economic priorities, but as a normal adjunct to them. In addition, this could indicate that our political moves must be governed by realism and factors that will be of benefit to Bulgaria.

Structure, Functions of Anticrime Service

95BA0322A Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 1 Aug 95 No 68, pp 1-4

["Text" from National Assembly Ukase No 226]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 98 Item 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, I hereby

Decree

The publication in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK of the Law on the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, passed by the 37th National Assembly on 19 July 1995.

Issued in Sofia on 28 July 1995 and stamped with a state seal.

President of the Republic: Zhelyu Zhelev

Law on the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime

Chapter I

General StipulationsArticle 1. (1) The present law governs the organization and activities of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime is a specialized service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the purpose of counteracting organized crime.

Article 2. (1) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime carries out, independently or jointly with other specialized agencies, operative-investigative, intelligence-information and organizational activities to counteract:

1. Terrorist activities on the country's territory:

a. Against agencies and targets of the legislative, judicial, and executive authorities;

b. Against representatives and entities of foreign countries and international organizations and terrorist activities involving international participation;

c. Extortion, kidnapping, hostage-taking, threats, and crimes using dangerous means and violent actions committed by criminal groups and organizations;

2. Illegal production of and trade in narcotics:

a. Making use of the country's territory for illegal trafficking in narcotics and basic raw materials for their production;

b. The illegal production and distribution of opiates and psychotropic substances and raw materials for their production on the country's territory;

3. Organized smuggling and illegal deals involving the following:

a. Weapons, strategic raw materials, and goods for military and civilian use;

b. Motor vehicles;

c. Historical and cultural valuable items;

4. Illegally introducing into the country or taking out of the country individuals and engaging in organized coerced prostitution;

5. Organized crimes against the economic and financial system of the country:

a. Investing profits from criminal activities;

b. Obtaining benefits and acquiring property as a result of criminal activities;

c. Transporting, manufacturing, and circulating forged currency and securities;

d. Investing or acquiring illegal benefits through or from gambling;

e. Corrupting the state and local administrations.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may be assigned other activities only on the basis of a law.

Chapter II

Structure and Administration of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime

Section I

StructureArticle 3. (1) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall set up teams for operative activities and registration, information-organizational support, and administrative-service activities.

(2) The Sofia and regional internal affairs directorates may set up regional teams for the struggle against organized crime, which shall conduct operative activities and provide information support and operative registration.

(3) The structure and tables of organization of the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime shall be approved by the minister of internal affairs by proposal of the director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime.

Section II

AdministrationArticle 4. (1) The director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall:

1. Organize, guide and be responsible for the service's activities;

2. Inform and report to the minister of internal affairs, the chief secretary, and the secretaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the activities of the service;

3. Issue orders on the activities of the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime;

4. Coordinate the activities of the service with the other services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the other state agencies;

5. Guide the participation of the service in international cooperation with the respective services of other states and international organization;

6. Provide service and disciplinary control over the activities of the service personnel.

(2) The director may delegate some of his authority to the deputy directors of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime.

Article 5. (1) The director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall be appointed and dismissed in accordance with Article 61 of the Law on the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(2) The director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime must be a Bulgarian citizen with higher education and professional experience of no less than 10 years in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 6. (1) The deputy directors of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall:

1. Organize, direct and coordinate the activities of the service in the respective areas;

2. Be answerable and accountable to the director on the condition and results of the work;

3. Coordinate the work of the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime.

(2) The deputy directors may only be individuals who meet the stipulations of Article 5, paragraph 2.

Article 7. The heads of the various areas of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall organize, administer, and be answerable for the activities of their respective areas.

Article 8. (1) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall set up a consultative council, as an auxiliary agency of the director.

(2) The membership and functions of the council shall be approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

(3) Representatives of state agencies and organizations may participate in the meetings of the council.

Article 9. (1) The directors of the Sofia and regional internal affairs directorates shall provide general and direct guidance and shall coordinate the activities of the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime with the other territorial services.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall provide guidance, coordination, control, and methodical functions to the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime.

(3) The heads of the regional teams for the struggle against organized crime shall provide direct guidance

and shall inform the respective directors as per paragraph one on the state of the operative situation and the results of the accomplished work and shall report to the director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime.

Chapter III

Organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized CrimeArticle 10. (1) In the sense of this law, the organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall comprise officers, noncommissioned officers, and supernumerary service personnel.

(2) The authority of the supernumerary associates shall be defined by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 11. In exercising their authority, the organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall obey only the law and the orders of their superiors.

Article 12. (1) In exercising their authority, the organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall prove their status by displaying their official cards or special badges.

(2) The design of the service cards and specialized badges shall be determined by the minister of internal affairs.

Chapter IV

Authority of the Organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized CrimeArticle 13. (1) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall observe, identify, and maintain control over individuals about whom there is information concerning their links with criminal activities as per Article 2.

(2) the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall counteract the organized crime on the territory of the entire country.

Article 14. (1) In exercising their authority, the organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may recruit citizens for voluntary cooperation.

(2) The conditions and procedures for such voluntary cooperation shall be defined with a legal act issued by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 15. The organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall engage in operative-investigative activities in the performance of their functions and in the border control area, in accordance with a procedure defined by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 16. Together with the customs authorities and by permission of the respective prosecutor's office, the organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may provide controlled supplies.

Article 17. The organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may, in accordance with the stipulations of the law, demand of merchants, banks, state authorities, or organizations to submit banking, financial, and commercial information for investigating and confiscating profits from organized criminal activities.

Article 18. (1) The organs of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall gather, process, and file data on individuals, activities, and facts related to organized crime.

(2) The services of the ministry of internal affairs shall submit to the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime information related to organized crime.

(3) Information provided by the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime to other competent state authorities and mass media shall be based on a procedure determined by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 19. (1) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall set up information data banks to meet its requirements.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may use properly coordinated files of state organs and organizations.

Article 20. The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall report on organized crime and its perpetrators in accordance with a procedure formulated by the minister of internal affairs.

Chapter V

Coordination and Interaction With State Authorities, Organizations, and Private CitizensArticle 21. (1) The interaction between the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime and the other services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs shall be based on a procedure established by the minister of internal affairs.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall coordinate the activities of the respective services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in conducting joint activities for the detection and prevention of crime as per Article 2.

Article 22. (1) In accordance with the law, it is the obligation of state authorities, organizations and private citizens, to assist the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime in the performance of its functions.

(2) The Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime may interact with the respective services of a foreign country and with international organizations on the basis of concluded special agreements or international treaties, ratified, published, and enacted by the Republic of Bulgaria.

Chapter 6

Special Protection of the Personnel of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime

Article 23. The personnel of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall receive and use means for personal protection in accordance with the functions they perform.

Article 24. The personnel of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, the members of their families, and private citizens who have given direct assistance to the service may use a special system for address registration, and the registration of their personal automobiles and telephones, as defined by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 25. (1) The personnel of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall receive supplementary wages for specific risk factors in amounts of and according to the procedure formulated by the minister of internal affairs.

(2) Officers, noncommissioned officers, and supernumerary personnel of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall use urban public transportation free of charge.

Provisional and Concluding Stipulations

1. The Law on the Ministry of Internal Affairs (published in DV, No. 57, 1991; amended No. 77, 1991, No. 109, 1993, and No. 49, 1994) shall be amended as follows:

(1) An additional letter "e" is added to Article 19, Item 1:

"e. Illegally transporting people to other countries and organizing involuntary prostitution."

(2) The heading of Section 3 of Chapter 3 shall be amended to read as follows:

"The administration of the national services and of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

(3) In Article 49, paragraph 1, the words "and the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime" shall be added to the words "fire prevention."

(4) In Article 51, paragraph 3, the words "and directly" shall be added after the word "general."

(5) In Article 61, paragraph 1, the words "the director of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime" shall be added to the words "orders for the appointment of."

2. A new paragraph 3 is added to Article 6 of the Law on Pensions (published IZV., No. 91, 1957; amended, No. 92, 1957; amended and supplemented, No. 104, 1959, No. 51, 1961, No. 105, 1962; DV, No. 103, 1964, No. 92, 1965, Nos. 25 and 101, 1966, No. 102, 1967, Nos. 59 and 97, 1969, Nos. 48 and 63, 1970, Nos. 3 and 61, 1971, Nos. 36 and 65, 1972, No. 53, 1973, No. 34, 1974, Nos. 3, 36, and 53, 1975, Nos. 2 and 3, 1976, No. 80, 1979, No. 90, 1980, No. 9, 1981, No. 28, 1983, Nos. 44 and 69, 1984, Nos. 70 and 81, 1985, Nos. 6 and 46, 1989, amended, No. 61, 1989; amended and supplemented, No. 99, 1989, Nos. 6, 30, and 81, 1990, No. 12, 1991, Nos. 52 and 64 (resolution No. 11 of the Constitutional Court of 1992) and No. 85, 1992, No. 102, 1993, and No. 49, 1994):

"The officers and noncommissioned officers of the Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime shall have the right to a pension under the conditions of paragraph 1."

3. The present law shall be enacted one month after its publication in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK.

4. The execution of this law is assigned to the minister of internal affairs.

This law was passed by the 37th National Assembly on 19 July 1995 and stamped with the state seal.

Chairman of the National Assembly: Blagovest Sendov

Trade Ministry Rejects Russian Trade Bloc Offer

LD2009142395 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's proposal, put to the Czech Republic among others, for the revival of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CEMA] has been rejected by the Czech side. Talks on how to proceed further on this question are currently under way at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Ministry spokesman Kamil Cermak has given us more details:

[Begin Cermak recording] Although our experts from the Foreign Trade Department are studying the proposal here at this very minute, we are already able to say what our reaction will be. It will essentially be the same as the reaction of the Foreign Ministry, which means that, in our response, we will stress to the Russian authorities that the Czech Republic's efforts at integration are already clearly determined: These efforts are aimed at integration with the European Union, and, as far as the former socialist countries are concerned, we are intensively pushing the Central European Free Trade Association, which we consider to be another of our priorities.

As far as relations with the Russian Federation are concerned, we wish to stress that we want good economic ties to Russia, which is a traditional market, and we want to support our business community in a market environment, but we do not want to build the kind of institution Russia is currently offering us. The deal Russia is offering smacks clearly of the former CEMA. So it is: yes to good business ties, no to an institution of this type. That will be the spirit of our response. [end recording]

That was Industry and Trade Ministry spokesman Kamil Cermak.

Commentary on 'Context' of Perry's Visit

AU2009130395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 Sep 95 p 6

[Commentary by Michal Havran: "Some Connections of U.S. Defense Secretary's Visit to Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While we will be somewhat wiser only after the current visit to Slovakia by William Perry, U.S. secretary of defense, for now we want to pay heed to the overall context in which his historic visit is taking place. The fact remains, thank God, that, officially, Slovakia still champions the cause of its future NATO membership, especially verbally, even though it is known that there are representatives in Meciar's government coalition and, of course, in parliament whose angle of vision is different. A few days ago, when the Russian president's powerful voice let itself be heard, their ambitions surely received new nourishment. President Yeltsin does not like the idea of NATO moving closer to Russia's borders. In this connection, he even threatened a new, a third, world war. A shiver must run down one's spine after such words, and it is peculiar that neither the Slovak Government nor the Slovak parliament reacted in any way. Apparently, there is fear that their performance appraisals [kadrove hodnotenia] in Moscow might deteriorate. Until now, we also have not registered any reaction to the Russian plan for the revival of CEMA, made public by the Polish daily GAZETA WYBORCZA. But what reactions can one expect, considering that the political life in Slovakia has plenty of its own "far more important affairs" than this?

Why did William Perry come to Slovakia within the framework of his Central European tour? I will use the official explanation provided by the Slovak Ministry of Defense: "The visit takes place in connection with the discussion of issues concerning the security situation in Europe, the present state of the Partnership for Peace program, and the position of the United States on NATO enlargement issues, as well as to assess the development of mutual cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the United States." The range of issues to be discussed is thus known. The security situation in Europe is bad. There is fighting in the immediate vicinity. Nationalists in former Yugoslavia have almost brought Europe to its knees. Only when the Americans started becoming fully involved in the tragic massacre did a light appear at the end of the tunnel. The tragedy is that no forceful action to end the war was taken earlier. We will probably never learn why this did not happen. Many times in history, West European impotence caused unfathomed tragedies, and each time it was the United States that had to get Europe out of the bloody mess. Of course, for those Slovaks who no longer want to fear for their safety and who profess the values of Western democracy, even if only timidly, the number-one question is: Will Slovakia become a member of NATO and, if so, when?

During Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk's recent visit to Washington, one reporter asked Warren Christopher, U.S. secretary of state, whether Slovakia had already dropped off the list of candidates for membership in the Alliance. Christopher's reply was that it had not, simply because no such lists exists. Well, this was a good reply: If the list does not exist, no one can be dropped from it.... That makes sense. But, during his recent trip to Warsaw, it was precisely William Perry who said at a news conference that Poland would be among the first states to become NATO members. He did not mention any other countries, but, in newspapers, the ranking of states tends to be as follows: Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, while the name of Slovakia is invariably followed by a question mark. It is not our task to examine why this is so. The answer to the question should be given, in particular, by those who verbally proclaim Slovakia's endeavor to join NATO but who we feel are afraid of their own words. At the same time, history clearly tells us that it was NATO that saved Europe. Wherever NATO has sent down roots, there is a functioning democracy. All states touched by the outstretched Soviet arm of the Warsaw Pact fell prey to dictatorial regimes....

Kovac Offers Cooperation, Rejects Resignation

LD2009194495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we informed you yesterday, the Slovak Government called on Slovak President Michal Kovac to reconsider remaining in the post of president. [passage omitted]

Today, Slovak President Michal Kovac responded to this call in the presence of journalists. Just as yesterday we gave you the government statement, we are now giving you the full text of the president's statement.

[Begin Kovac recording] Esteemed citizens: Subsequent to the Slovak Government statement issued on 19 September 1995, I, as president of the Slovak Republic, resolutely reject the serious accusations suggesting that I am paralyzing the constitutional system and destabilizing Slovak society.

If the aim of the Slovak Government is to intimidate the president and drive him to resignation by escalating tension, I declare that I will remain in the post to which I was democratically elected.

One of the reasons for giving this statement is to prevent the Slovak Government statement intimidating those Slovak citizens whose views on public matters are different from the views of the government.

The allegations made in the statement are reminiscent of the vocabulary of the 1950's, when tens of thousands of our innocent fellow countrymen suffered after fabricated charges were brought against them.

The government has to respect other political, social, and civic partners. After the accusations directed at the Constitutional Court, churches, trade unions, the opposition, and the media, the president, alas, has been the prime target for several long months.

Various investigatory commissions have been working for almost a year. These commissions were set up in order to persuade citizens that Slovakia has been undergoing a constitutional crisis since March 1994. So far, neither Slovak citizens nor the Slovak parliament have been acquainted with any results of these commissions' efforts.

The government statement, however, presupposes that the government can prove that the president is a traitor. However, in the background of these attacks are citizens to whom the government has guaranteed neither a decent standard of living nor an opportunity for peaceful work.

One of the attributes of democracy is the ability to conduct a dialogue without forcing citizens to offer unqualified agreement. In Slovakia, everybody knows and almost everybody understands who has been escalating tension and attacking the president and when these attacks have been taking place. The scenario of removing the president was introduced during the general election campaign and is still being followed. The scenario even includes a plan to seal off the presidential residence for 42 weeks while surrounding it with sympathizers of the coalition from all over Slovakia.

Esteemed citizens, I have never exercised tabloid-style practices. On the contrary, I have always sought to act in a factual and civilized manner, even when my attitudes and views were not identical with the attitudes and views of the Slovak Government. I regard the pluralistic dialogue on public matters as entirely logical and natural. I do not consider any opponent who argues in a factual and correct fashion to be my enemy or, God forbid, a traitor.

I am deeply convinced that there are no constitutional or any other reasons for which I should resign from the post of president. I base my thoughts on the principles of a lawful, democratic state, in which both the president and the government have been endowed with their powers in a constitutional and democratic way. Both these parties, therefore, have a duty to respect each other and to communicate, at least minimally, to carry out their functions. This should apply even if they have certain personal or political reservations about one another. This is entailed in our duty to serve this country and the nation.

I do not identify with the government's view that further cooperation is impossible. On the contrary, I remain convinced that this cooperation is necessary. For these and many other reasons, I would like to repeat my proposal to the prime minister to hold a special meeting where we will talk in a peaceful and matter-of-fact fashion while respecting constitutional principles. At this meeting, we can discuss all of the problematic issues and relationships, and, at the same time, we can look for a possible dialogue.

Slovak citizens, I appeal to you: Do not be put off by these nonsensical political attacks, which lack factual arguments. We have a historical task in front of us. The task is to build our sovereign Slovak Republic as a modern European state able to defend its place in the community of the world's free nations. Let us all devote ourselves to fruitful jobs according to our social and work-related capacities. That is the genuine and realistic policy. That is the path that leads to the fulfillment of the just demands of Slovak citizens. [end recording]

Party Representatives on Kovac-Government Conflict

LD2009174795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we have already reported, the Slovak Government on 19 September issued a statement asking President Michal Kovac to resign. [passage omitted]

Ludmila Bulakova and Alena Michalicova [Slovak radio editors] have asked representatives of parliamentary parties for their views on finding a solution to this situation. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Bulakova] Jan Carnogursky, Christian Democratic Movement [chairman].

[Carnogursky] By issuing this statement and calling for the resignation of President Michal Kovac yesterday, the government further escalated its confrontation with the constitutional system of the Slovak Republic and with the citizens of the Slovak Republic. The government has disgraced Slovakia. There is no reason for the president of the Republic to resign. The only solution to this situation is for Slovak citizens to withdraw their support for the ruling coalition parties, to make it possible to elect a new government whose political culture would be higher than that of the present government.

[Bulakova] Ludovit Cernak from the Democratic Union.

[Cernak] One can view the problem of relations between the president and parliament [words indistinct] from three viewpoints—the factual, the ethical, and the political.

As far as the factual point of view is concerned, the president acted strictly in line with the Constitution. [passage omitted]

The president had allowed sufficient time to indicate that his approach was accommodating and that he wanted to hold talks. From this viewpoint, it was not the presidents' statement but the fact that this (?dispute) was revived and exacerbated that inflicted enormous damage on the Slovak Republic.

Regarding the ethical viewpoint, I firmly believe that the enormous pressure and a number of attacks—be it the media attacks, his son's abduction, or the parliamentary and government vote of no confidence—are matters that are unprecedented in Slovak politics and that are turning Slovak society increasingly more radical.

From the political viewpoint, I believe that the government has embarked on a path of self-destruction and that even the hardline supporters of Meciar have awakened because it is disrespecful that this kind of attack should be waged against one person and that the head of state should be (?disgraced) in this way.

There is only one solution. The government has to realize that it was the parliament that endorsed it and the parliament that approved its policy manifesto in order for it to rule and not create scandals around the Slovak president.

What this amounts to is that Meciar should back down, accept the invitation to the castle, sit down with the president at the table, and shake hands, and they should at least pretend that they want to work for the good of Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Bulakova] Miklos Duray from Coexistence [Hungarian ethnic movement].

[Duray] From the political viewpoint, we can consider this situation very dangerous. The government's statement that it could not see any possibility for further cooperation amounted to a declaration of total war against the president, and, in political terms, this could be very dangerous. I think a solution to this situation is (?not easy). [passage omitted] [end recording]

Meciar Approves Mochovce Power Station Completion

LD2009115195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The completion of the construction of the Mochovce nuclear power station will be carried out by Russian engineers without Western technology and financial assistance. As Otto Majewski, chairman of the board of Bayernwerk AG, said yesterday, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar sent him a letter saying that the remaining blocks of Mochovce will be built by the [Czech] Skoda concern.

The nuclear power station in Jaslovske Bohunice, considered dangerous by the West, will not be shut down either.

Majewski said he was disappointed at this political decision by Slovakia.

IMF Agrees With Aims of Economic Reform Policy

LD2009125795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The IMF agrees with the aims of the Hungarian government's three-year program and its plans for the reform of state finances.

According to a statement issued after the conclusion of the talks in Budapest, the IMF thinks that deterioration in the international balance of payments has slowed down by the second half of 1995, but the process of running into debts has not stopped yet.

According to the statement, the IMF delegation assessed primarily the previously announced crawling peg devaluation system of the forint. However, the time when Hungary can expect a loan to help the country's stabilization has not been revealed.

Ethnic Slovaks Complain to Human Rights Group

AU2009115395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 16 Sep 95 pp 1, 6

[Report by TASR Correspondent Monika Wolekova: "Slovaks in Hungary Have Appealed to the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest—Imrich Fuhl, Alexander Kormos, Michal Hrivnak, and Gregor Papucek, prominent representatives of alternative Slovak minority organizations in Hungary, have for the first time in history filed a complaint with the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission.

In a seven-page document dated 13 September 1995, they inform the commission about the causes of the current adverse situation of Slovaks in Hungary and Hungary's practical policy toward the ethnic minorities. The main subject of the complaint is the irregular course of elections of members of the National Self-Administration Body of Slovaks in Hungary. "The inevitable consequence of this policy, which leads to the merciless elimination of minorities within Hungary, is, in the final analysis, also the assimilation of Hungarian minorities beyond the Hungarian borders," it is stated in the complaint, among other things.

According to the signatories, the Hungarian state has no intention of supporting the efforts of the most active and nationally most aware part of the Slovak intelligentsia and strives to discredit the most active minority rights activists and to shunt them into the sidelines, with intense assistance from the Association of Slovaks in Hungary [ZSM]. The state apparatus uses financial and various other means to cripple the opposition, so-called alternative, organizations of Slovaks in Hungary. With assistance from faithful servants among the ethnic minority and using time-worn methods, the state apparatus discredits and often threatens the existence of our most active experts, which is causing concern. On the other hand, the government supports, financially, morally, and politically, the ZSM, which is unswervingly loyal to the practice of Hungarian policy toward the ethnic minorities. This clearly surfaced during the elections for local ethnic self-administration bodies toward the end of last year when the ZSM received tens of millions of forints in state subsidies, while other Slovak organizations operating nationwide did not receive so much as a penny, the signatories of the complaint write.

The complaint concerns the course of the 25 March 1995 elections of members of the National Self-Administration Body of Slovaks in Hungary, during which, the signatories allege, the law on the rights of ethnic minorities was violated because the ballot was not secret. The Hungarian Supreme Court rejected the appeal against the elections without even investigating the matter. It is pointed out in the complaint that on 28 March six electors appealed over this matter to the National Electoral Committee, but have received no response from it, and that no legal recourse against a decision of the Supreme Court is possible in Hungary.

"We expect the Council of Europe Human Rights Commission to set this matter right, to ascertain that the procedure by the National Electoral Commission and the Hungarian Supreme Court against the six Slovak electors was discriminatory against the plaintiffs, and to declare that valid legal regulations were violated in the elections of members of the National Slovak Self-Administration Body in Budapest on 25 March. On 8 June, we also addressed our complaint to Max van der Stoel, the OSCE high commissioner for minorities, but have received no reply from him yet," the leading representatives of the Slovak ethnic minority in Hungary state at the close of their complaint.

Horn in Dispute With National Assembly Committee

AU2109102195 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Correspondent's report: "The Foreign Affairs Committee Insists on Hearing Horn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, Prime Minister Gyula Horn should revise his decision not to inform a closed meeting of the committee about his meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in Otatrafured. According to Eorsi, with this decision, the prime minister has provided serious arguments for the opposition, and the National Assembly will probably discuss Horn's refusal to report on the meeting.

In a letter dated 14 September, Horn wrote that he would not regard as fortunate a practice in which various parliamentary committees regularly asked the prime minister to report on his various meetings and talks. According to the letter, Horn also finds it unfortunate that some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee had criticized his nonappearance even before he had had a chance to reply to the request to report to the committee.

In his reply letter, Eorsi pointed out that advance criticism is not sufficient reason to turn down the invitation. And the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is currently abroad, told us that it was understandable from a professional point of view to invite Horn to report to the committee because there is no opportunity to assert such viewpoints at the plenary session. Besides, parliament, which is responsible to the Constitution, cannot be identified simply with the plenary session—Eorsi pointed out. The various committees are also a part of it. Horn turned down the invitation for reasons of prestige. Consequently, the affair continues in the press, and not in the closed meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

According to constitutional law expert Istvan Lovetei, it is true that it is parliament's job to supervise the government, but this does not mean that the government can be "ordered about." The practice could be decisive, but we cannot even speak of a practice in this case. To date, only the late prime minister Jozsef Antall has appeared before a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees. This was in connection with the ominous scandal of arms sales to Croatia.

Under the Constitution everyone is obliged to provide the information sought by the parliamentary committees, or to report to them. In this case, however, the two sides approached the problem in different ways—Istvan Lovetei pointed out. He said that one should not confuse a committee procedure in which everyone is obliged to appear personally with the general right of parliament to supervise the government.

Ruling Coalition 'Continues To Mark Time'

AU2109092395 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Sep 95 p 1

[Editorial by Lorinc Szendrei: "Marking Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After talks that lasted hardly more than 30 minutes, politicians of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] left the prime minister's office as if they were leaving the coalition for good. The swarm of journalists, always hungry for news, quickly realized that appearances are deceptive, but many signs attest to the fact these appearances are closer to the truth than any previous signs.

Although no statement was made on terminating the coalition, the SZDSZ chairman made absolutely no secret of the fact that the positions had not become closer at all; in other words, the coalition continues to mark time. Reading between lines, Gyula Horn maintains there is a need for a government reshuffle, while his partner does not want to agree to this at all. We have been able to learn the arguments and counterarguments in recent days. Two weeks ago, it seemed that the longest coalition crisis was over. However, the socialists have been increasingly criticizing their liberal partners ever since and, as we have learned, the toughest forms of this criticism were mentioned at the meeting of the National Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] on Monday [18 September].

So, the power redistribution continues, something that occasionally resembles the intellectual game of chess and at other times the side-kicking and bone-crunching game of rugby. It seems that one of the parties will soon have to finally give up its position and image, and either adapt to its partner or seek a new place for itself in the political spectrum.

In the meantime, society is also searching for its own future image, calm, and security with increasing bitterness. Thus, tension does not only thrive in the depths of coalition cabals but also in the workplace, in families, or in offices distributing unemployment benefits for that matter. And this is no longer marking time, but crawling backward until we reach a point when not only the ruling parties will be dissatisfied with each other, but the majority of the population will be dissatisfied with the government.

Keleti Comments on Recent Air Force Accidents

AU1909074295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 18 Sep 95 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Antal Andrassy in Budapest; date not given: "Why Are Our Combat Aircraft Crashing?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 18 Hungarian military aircraft suffered some kind of accident in 1994, and four aircraft have suffered accidents in 1995 so far. These tragedies claimed 11 victims. Why are our combat aircraft crashing? we asked Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti after his return from Norway.

[Keleti] About the recent accident, we already know for sure that there was no technical failure involved in this accident. If the further investigation also justifies this, we will cancel the flight ban on the two types of combat aircraft in a few days, and this is rather important for guarding Hungary's airspace.

[Andrassy] So human error was involved in these accidents and, thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that the two aircraft on a joint mission collided or brushed each other during flight?

[Keleti] That is true, because the pilot from Kecskemet also spoke about a big bang followed by the warning signals of engine problem. However, the investigation still has to prove the possible human error.

[Andrassy] Is there any connection between the possible human error and the crashing of aircraft on the one hand, and the decreasing number of flight hours due to budget restrictions on the other?

[Keleti] Of course, there is some connection between the two. It is not accidental that NATO pilots spend 150 to 200 hours in the air, while Hungarian pilots only fly 60 to 70 hours. It seems that increasing the number of flights is inevitable. However, unfortunately, this means that our aircraft would become obsolete faster, and replacing them seriously burdens our national economy.

[Andrassy] Confusing information emerged in the first 24 hours after the accident: First, they mentioned separate accidents, and it only became clear later that this was a joint exercise; there was silence about the possibility of a collision for quite some time. Why?

[Andrassy] The fact of a joint exercise was obvious, because a MiG-29 also participated in the exercise. I do not know why things were not presented this way. I was in Norway. Perhaps old habits still persist. The press is impatient too. However, a statement issued too soon can easily cause confusion, particularly if it is not in harmony with the final report of the investigating committees. I would mention, however, that we have never yet held a news conference at the location of a crash.

Possible Purchase of Combat Aircraft Examined

AU2009072495 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 16 Sep 95 p 10

[Article by Andrej Kiss: "The Big Hungarian Combat Aircraft Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Selling combat aircraft is a very good business even if the buyer is a poor country like Hungary. It is not exclusively the price of several tens of millions of U.S. dollars that makes the negotiations and the decisionmaking so complex. In addition to military policy, avionics, and financial considerations, long-term foreign policy, industrial development, and state-level strategy factors also affect the agreements between sellers and buyers. The government in Budapest is currently at the very beginning of its plan to modernize the Hungarian Air Force, so this problem is now affecting those who are in favor and those who are against the plan with all its weight.

Given the fact that the state of the Hungarian Air Force is a state secret, only a narrow circle of leading people has reliable information about this. However, one does not have to break a safe open in order draw the conclusion from open source information: the army is threateningly lagging behind regarding its technology and expensive training because of insufficient funds.

Compared to what? At the moment, Hungary is not in a situation to regard any NATO member state as a standard. Nor is it desirable to use the well-known struggling of former Warsaw Pact member states as a cause for inaction. According to rumors not confirmed officially, the Hungarian Air Force has been critically approaching the point when it will be unable to carry out its most basic task. Inasmuch as this is true, it is quite understandable that the Hungarian Government is actively searching for possible solutions.

Comparing the technical parameters of the combat aircraft available on the world market is only one of the many tasks. In the case of the combat aircraft under consideration, namely the MiG-29, the F-16, and the Jas-39 Gripen, all the technical parameters seem to make each of them a winner. All these types are capable of reliably defending the Hungarian airspace.

The F-16's and the Jas-39 Gripen are fast and easily maneuverable, and they are extremely efficient in ruling the airspace despite their relatively smaller fire power. The MiG's are more robust and stronger, but only bigger countries with a broader air space can really make full use of their ability.

A political factor speaks against the electronically less modern MiG's, namely that NATO membership is among Hungary's declared goals. For NATO membership, in addition to the political will of the West, we have to fulfill certain technical requirements as well. The Hungarian Army has to be made compatible with the NATO system. However, while soldiers can be retrained, combat aircraft can only be modified partially. The addition of certain essential electronics is so expensive that it is easier to fully turn toward NATO's compatible system.

Of course, Budapest can only take this step by taking into consideration the Russians' possible reactions. These steps could harm the nonmilitary trade contacts, and they could also affect the prices of all the military products that the Hungarian Army wants to purchase for years to come.

Based on recent events, the suppliers of the Swedish Jas-39 Gripen acquired serious advantages over their competitors. Apparently, the Americans stick to payment in cash, while the latest Swedish offer is really noble. Of course, the political will above business considerations might also modify Washington's position.

The Hungarian Government must decide on the Gripen deal by the end of 1996. This fact will presumably increase the struggle among those who hope to get involved in this deal worth millions. Sweden is trying to influence the purchasing intention of the Hungarian Government by offering an economic development plan worth $1 billion, a plan to be implemented by the turn of the century. This program would affect industrial modernization as a whole, it would affect employment, and it would open new markets for Hungarian products. Prime Minister Gyula Horn said that the contract signed with Sweden was the most important bilateral agreement in the past five years.

This sentence also shows that it will be difficult for anyone to surpass the joint Swedish Investor-Saab offer.

Sacirbegovic's Peace Undertakings Viewed

Calls For Political Settlement

AU2009121795 Paris AFP in English 1130 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, Sept 20 (AFP)—Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic said here Wednesday [20 September] that "the time has come" to switch to political negotiations in the Balkans.

"We are not at war with Banja Luka or the Serbs, but we are at war with the fascist and paramilitary forces who are in zones such as Banja Luka," he said after talks with his Italian counterpart Susana Agnelli.

"We are there to liberate the territories occupied by the fascists and to ensure the security of the population again," he added.

Bosnian Government and Croat forces have made sweeping gains in offensives in central and western Bosnia in the last week and now threaten the Serb-held town of Banja Luka, although Sacirbegovic said they were still outside it.

Welcomes Italian Troops

LD2009122395 Rome RAI Televideo Teletext in Italian 1140 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Italy's role in the former Yugoslavia is "very important" and in the future could be extended to the rebuilding and the maintenance of peace with the sending of troops which would be "welcome."

This was said by Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic, at the end of talks in the Farnesina [Italian Foreign Ministry] with Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli.

In Bosnia, Sacirbey added, "the time has come to move to political talks."

Resumption of NATO Air Strikes Discussed

NATO Rules Out Strikes

AU2009144095 Paris AFP in English 1426 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Sept 20 (AFP)—A resumption of NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs was ruled out by alliance ambassadors Wednesday [20 September], diplomatic sources said.

The ambassadors agreed that the Bosnian Serbs had done "just about enough" to be seen to have complied with NATO and UN demands that they withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo by 2000 GMT Wednesday, one source said.

There was also a feeling that in light of the reduced threat to Sarajevo and the advances made by the Bosnian government forces in northwestern Bosnia, any fresh intervention by NATO warplanes could not fail but to appear overtly partisan, they said.

It was not clear however if NATO would suspend its raids indefinitely or simply prolong the six-day pause announced last week.

The ambassadors from the 16 countries were given a lengthy presentation on the Bosnian situation by U.S. General George Joulwan, NATO's supreme commander in Europe.

Joulwan told the ambassadors that the new frontlines established between Bosnian Government and Croat forces on the one hand and the Bosnian Serbs on the other appeared to be stable.

Joulwan was not expecting any major new offensive by either party, diplomats said.

Muratovic Argues for Resumption

AU2009185395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In light of the ultimatum for the withdrawal of the aggressor's heavy weapons from the 20-km exclusion zone, which expires at 2200 [2000 GMT] tonight, the B-H PRESS news agency has learned in the bureau of Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the State Committee for Liaison With the United Nations, that between 30 and 40 pieces of heavy weaponry would remain within the area defined as the Sarajevo exclusion zone.

Namely, by this afternoon, the Serbian aggressor's forces only pulled out some 250 of the 380 pieces that had been situated within the 20-km zone. According to the surveys that monitor very carefully the withdrawal of the arms, there is a chance that a negligible number of weapons will be withdrawn by 2200. This means that at least 100 to 130 weapons will remain within the exclusion zone.

Pursuant to the conditions issued to the Serbian aggressor's side, NATO would have to renew the air strikes as the threat to the civilians in Sarajevo has not been removed yet and the Pale Serbs have not withdrawn the heavy weapons from Sarajevo.

The other two conditions due to which the air strikes started have also not been fulfilled. Namely, the road through Ilidza was only opened for the convoys of the United Nations, that is, for the UN Protection Force and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], while the supply of energy sources and water is still blocked. The permission for the entry of humanitarian aid only and not for all other goods that are necessary for normal life in the town and the resumption of production means that the town continues to be under blockade. The airport, too, is only open for the United Nations, which means that citizens and all state institutions are blocked. The town cannot function with the help of convoys and UN humanitarian aid aircraft. We can thus conclude that the threat to the civilians in Sarajevo has not been removed and that the blockade of the town has not been lifted. As the Serbs have failed to meet NATO's conditions, we expect that air strikes will be resumed or that the Serbs will be issued with a new deadline to comply with all the conditions, Minister Hasan Muratovic said at the end of the statement for B-H PRESS.

NATO-UN Statement on Air Strikes Reported

AU2109073095 Paris AFP in English
0001 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Naples, Italy, Sept 20 (AFP)—"Admiral Smith and General Janvier have concluded that the Bosnian Serbs have complied with the conditions set out in General Janvier's letter of Sept 3, 1995. Specifically, that they withdraw defined heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone.

"This withdrawal has been supervised by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UN patrols have been travelling through the exclusion zone to verify the removal of the weapons and the destruction of those that remain.

"The airport has been opened. UN and humanitarian traffic has unimpeded access on the main routes into Sarajevo As confidence grows, access should include civilian traffic.

"Admiral Smith and General Janvier have therefore agreed that the resumption of airstrikes is currently not necessary.

"The Bosnian Serbs have expressed themselves willing to discuss a cessation of hostilities agreement at any time. The UN and NATO continue to urge all parties to join the Bosnian Serbs and finalise a cessation of hostilities agreement for the Sarajevo area, with the chief of mission and the commander of UNPROFOR, with a view to extending it to a complete and countrywide cessation of hostilities at the earliest opportunity.

"Notwithstanding the above decision, at this point Admiral Smith and General Janvier would emphasise that any subsequent attacks on Sarajevo or any other safe area, and other noncompliance to the exclusion zone, freedom of movement or the functioning of the airport, would be subject to investigation and resumption of airstrikes."

UN Quotes Own Territorial Control Figures

AU2009114495 Paris AFP in English
1047 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Sept 20 (AFP)—Allied Moslem and Croat forces control only 50 percent of Bosnia and not more than 60 percent as reported from Zagreb, several UN officials said Wednesday.

"We're sticking to the 50 percent figure," UN spokesman Chris Vernon said as he unveiled a map of Bosnia showing the disposition of the various forces.

Earlier reports from Zagreb said a new analysis by the United Nations that the Bosnian Serbs, which had held 70 percent of the territory for several years, had seen their share drop to as little as 35 percent following strong military gains by Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces backed by the Croatian army in northwest and central Bosnia.

"The figure of 60 to 65 percent (for the Serbs) is wrong," said another UN spokeswoman, Myriam Sochaki. "Our estimates are exact within one or two percent."

Under the latest US-brokered peace plan, the Bosnian Serbs are to get 49 percent of Bosnia and the Croat-Moslem federation 51 percent.

Opposition Parties Skeptical of U.S. Plan

AU2009165995 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sep 95 p 8

[Interview with Selim Beslagic, chairman of the Union of Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Vehid Jahic; place and date not given: "I Am Afraid of the Partitioning of Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Geneva principles on undoing the Bosnian bloody knot have caused different reactions among the public, ranging from approval to disappointment. OSLOBODJENJE has talked with the leaders of the parliamentary parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and through a series of talks will present their views of the Geneva agreement and the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The U.S. peace initiative in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—supported by massive NATO air strikes—is for many analysts the first realistic chance for peace since the beginning of the Serbian-Montenegrin aggression. For others it is the first step toward the final partition of Bosnia. How does Selim Beslagic, chairman of the Union of Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, look at the Geneva principles?

[Jahic] How do you feel about the US initiative?

[Beslagic] Any normal man wants peace. Whether the U.S. initiative will bring it about is hard to say for the time being. As this initiative is actively supported by NATO forces, it seems to me that a truce is imminent. Yet, whether a lasting and just peace will come about in this region I cannot tell right now.

Absurdity of the Situation

[Jahic] Why?

[Beslagic] Because I actually do not know what is in the peace package. I think that the ordinary Bosnian or Bosniak is not familiar with all the elements of the proposed peace settlement. Our own skin is at stake, and we still do not know what is being offered to us. I do not know whether there is anybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if yes, then who that person is, who is familiar with all the elements of their proposal, but I know that the ordinary man is not familiar with it.

[Jahic] The basic elements of the plan have been presented to the public at home and abroad right after the meeting in Geneva. What do you think about the elements already known?

[Beslagic] Those are fundamental principles of the peace plan. For the time being it is known that two substrates are being proposed—that of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian entity. How the Serbian entity will look like and what it implies is not quite clear, but the very fact that such a separate entity is being proposed is not a good thing.

[Jahic] Why?

[Beslagic] First of all because it will be a sort of recognition of some of the aggressor's gains, and second, because such a system may be used tomorrow by Croats, that is, by Herzeg-Bosnia, as a pretext to demand a separate entity for themselves. That will then be a complete ethnic segmentation or partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that—when speaking about the Serbs—goes without saying in the current peace initiative.

The Role of Force

[Jahic] The peace initiative is sustained by military force and the guarantee that the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain in its internationally recognized borders, which will in the perspective create preconditions for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. How do you view that?

[Beslagic] If we look at the peace initiative only from the point of view of force, the basic question is: Why did they wait for so long? Why did they allow the aggressor to kill so many innocent civilians, devastate the country, commit so many war crimes...? I do not know whether force is a means of establishing a truce or will be a guarantee for peace. Those are two different things....

[Jahic] How do you view the role of force?

[Beslagic] It is clear to me that a peace settlement must be imposed by force in such circumstances. But force is not necessary only to impose a truce, but also a peace, which presupposes a change in the mandate of the international forces that would be guarding the state border and ensuring the right to the refugees' return. If they return to their homes there will be no ethnically pure entities any more. That is very important for peace, just as it is important that we do not have any ethnically pure administrative units, while on the other hand it is normal that there are some with a dominant ethnic majority. A mere majority and ethnic purity are two completely different things. We already have experience in that regard. The federation was established a year or more ago. The return of refugees has been declared possible, while you see what is happening on the ground. I am afraid of the prospect of permanent freezing of ethnically pure regions, which would mean de facto the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are forces desiring separation of Serbs or Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while they do not want any division of the ethnic body in Serbia or Croatia.

[Jahic] Do you still hold reservations toward the peace initiative?

[Beslagic] Yes, I do. It was said many times that there would be no negotiations with war criminals, but they are nevertheless involved in the process. Which means, in a way those war criminals are still influencing the fate of the victim.

Two Faiths of the Serb Entity

[Jahic] Is there anything good in the U.S. peace initiative?

[Beslagic] Of course there is. If it succeeds in bringing the war and killing to an end, the progress is undeniable. When speaking about this initiative then I refer to the long-term perspective of Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than to daily policy. For that reason I am so critical.

[Jahic] What is the role of internal political forces in establishing peace?

[Beslagic] It is crucial. Serbia and the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] have started the aggression, they have equipped and assisted Karadzic's fascists in fighting for the goals of foreign aggressor. For the time being the balance of power is such that in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are no forces capable of bringing

Karadzic's fascist parastate to an immediate collapse, because by imposing an arms embargo the world has made it impossible for us to defend ourselves. Therefore it is our moral right to demand protection from the world, and also to demand enforcement of conditions for a lasting peace. This presupposes the elimination of Karadzic's line and negotiations with sensible people—Serbs—in the temporarily occupied territories. You see, national exclusiveness is one of the major causes of the aggression, and now the imposition of any peace settlement involving national division does mean in a way the partition of Bosnia. I repeat, I am afraid that because of the separateness of the Serbian entity it may cause a breakup in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jahic] Many people think that the most difficult job will be to draft the maps. What do you think about that?

[Beslagic] The Federation and the Bosniaks have no perspective without an access to the sea and to the Sava river. I am afraid it might come to identification of nation with territory. It is a retrogressive political process that was causing conflicts in the past as well. Therefore, I consider the ethnic division dangerous and irrelevant for the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pig in the Package

[Jahic] What alternative do you propose?

[Beslagic] The platform of our party is well known. Those are modern and democratic civil solutions which presuppose a high degree of human rights, multiparty parliamentary democracy, freedom of private initiative, free movement of capital and commodities, lawfulness, rather than arbitrariness of ruling structures, separation of church from the state, that is, a secular state, the full observation of rights of peoples and minorities, rather than chiefly of the nation. I am afraid that the package of democratic proposals—at least at this moment—does not offer such a wide spectrum of democratic rights for our citizens, but it rather projects solutions involving ethnically homogeneous groups in certain territories.

[Jahic] Who is to be negotiated with about such a state system?

[Beslagic] With the assistance and brokerage of the international community it should be negotiated with people who are for the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina in its internationally recognized borders. There are such people even in the temporarily occupied territories. They accept the principles that war criminals should be brought to justice, refugees returned to their homes, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a federation of cantons, rather than of national entities. War criminals have fought for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and segregation of peoples, and how are we supposed to negotiate with them now? If NATO is using force to compel the aggressor to accept negotiations and stop the war, it should also use force to establish a just peace, that is, to eliminate circumstances that may cause new conflicts in the future.

[Jahic] How familiar are you personally with the details of the US initiative?

[Beslagic] It is a paradox that I have spoken about the peace initiative even though I am not familiar with all the elements of that plan. You know, my party—by the will of the state leadership—has been excluded from the process. It is a little bit paradoxical that we are being offered a peace package the contents of which are unknown to us. Those who are involved in the negotiations certainly know much more about it. I do not know why they have not disclosed all the cards yet.

Commentary: Choice Between 'Bad Peace,' 'War'

AU2009154195 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Hamza Baksic: "Does Bosnia Live There?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina is now facing a choice between a bad peace and a good, but fierce war, and events are making the champions of each of these options discernible. What the two options have in common is that they involve a high level of uncertainty. The war would be uncertain as wars go, while peace could differ from others when and if it ever comes about.

The possible negotiations should result in a complex and unstable state, which is good only insofar as it is an alternative to a stable and simple war, which, apart from everything else, has cost some $100 billion, something that is least often mentioned.

This possible Bosnia-Herzegovina will become a state—a sovereign state, etc.—at the same rate at which human rights, above all its citizens' right to return to their old addresses, occurs. It is not likely that individual rights, now thrown on top of three collective heaps, can be realized by the act of signing an agreement or approving a constitution. Therefore, it is not probable that, in some future peaceful Bosnia, columns of refugees and expelled people will be setting off for home en masse in the same way as they set off into the big wide world. However, negotiations and constitutional principles may interrupt the process of return, even if only at the level of intentions. If this does not happen, negotiations will lead to the organic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the intentions of the negotiators and patrons, as well as all the percentages and ethnic watersheds, pale into insignificance compared with that.

If any kind of peace is achieved in the foreseeable future, it will create conditions for a different way of perceiving the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Peace has the characteristic of dissipating social problems into individual troubles and profits, if anybody in fact still remembers this. Therefore a Bosnia-Herzegovina whose constitutional principles focus on human rights and whose unity is based on the right to chose one's place of abode and the right to private property would have to be built up from the bottom, that is, from human rights, and not from the top, that is, from national ones, albeit respecting the latter, particularly because the armed forces stand behind them. In this regard, the experiences from the so-called implementing the Federation on the ground are enlightening.

Although an annex to the Constitution contains a sizable list of international conventions on human rights, the disputes that have arisen so far make the list resemble a footnote. Had the Federation been approached from the angle of the right to political organization that must be equally implemented throughout its territory or the right to disseminate and receive information, the principled disputes would look like petty personal aggressiveness or bellicosity.

A future Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Federation is supposed to also join will remain a nowhere land, a state about which nothing is known other than that it will be very expensive if the conditions are not created to reconstruct the previous Bosnia-Herzegovina on its territory and if it is not done in the individual and human sense and at the level of individual rights, the first of which is people's return, their gradual return, to their homes. As the latest experiences show, this right cannot be realized through war. Everybody sooner or later will follow his army. Some historians found history books too difficult, so they decided to make learning history easier for their children.

Everything suggests that all the current political currents and options will remain in use in this possible state—under their present names or nicknames. The most that can be expected is that the means for war will be replaced by the means for political struggle.

Restoring things, if that means building a modern European society based on the traditions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will not be a job for one generation. However, this generation, that is, the politicians representing it, who are the best that this generation can provide, could at least insist on a solution that would minimize the effect on the future of the results of the end of the 20th century.

A long time ago, Muhamed Cengic indignantly told some strikers, who had come to the Assembly to seek justice, that the rule of law would come into force as of Monday. Cengic went, perhaps it was on that Monday, to one of the states based on the rule of law, war has raged here, but nothing could destroy the misconception that the rule of law will start on Monday. The main shortcoming of the new Bosnia project is, as far as anything is known about it, that there will always be a possibility to hide minor human problems by drawing over them the veil of major national interests and that these interests will always be there to be used by legal or self-styled representatives.

So far, the war has lasted over three years, at least this open and bloody part of it following the open aggression. If, by a new document, Cengic's Monday is put off by four or five more years, it will never come. People will give up painstakingly insisting on justice and will decide to "get on" with their lives in any possible way and in any possible place.

France's Millon on Fate of Pilots, Peace Plan

AU2009185695 Paris AFP in English
1837 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, Sept 20 (AFP)—Negotiations for the release of the two French pilots shot down over Bosnia last month will be integrated into an overall peace plan for the country, French Defence Minister Charles Millon announced Wednesday [20 September].

Millon said he was "convinced" the two officers, whose Mirage was shot down on August 30, were prisoners of the Serbs.

Speaking after meeting the Senate's Foreign Affairs and Defence committee, he told AFP: "We have asked the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to intervene in the matter.

"We are also asking the laws of war to be respected. Now this is going to be integrated into the peace plan."

French President Jacques Chirac had been "on the phone to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic several times," he stressed.

Milosevic had "guaranteed the fate of the pilots," shot down over the Serb stronghold of Pale, near Sarajevo, he said.

"The pilots, one of whom is wounded, are alive, according to contact we have had with the Serbs. I hope they are not lying," he said, recalling that as French defence minister, he had taken charge of the NATO operation to find them.

"The first two operations, using American helicopters and a mixed Franco-American team, did not succeed because of the weather," he said.

A third attempt came under fire from the Serbs, he said.

Millon announced on Monday he had contacted the ICRC, the first official acknowledgement that the two pilots had been captured.

The ICRC is called in by countries to deal with prisoners of war.

The two pilots were shot down on the first day of NATO air raids launched against Bosnian Serb positions in a bid to force them to withdraw heavy weapons from a 20 kilometer (12-mile) radius around Sarajevo.

Immediately after the shooting down of the plane, Bosnian Serb officials in Pale had said the two men had been captured and were being detained by Serb authorities, but the report could not be independently confirmed.

Delic Says Situation 'Better Than Expected'

AU2009115195 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Azra Kaurin at Zagreb airport; date not specified: "The Maps Will Have To Be Redrawn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While territories in western and central Bosnia were being liberated, Army General Rasim Delic was participating in the conference of Islamic countries with the new ministers of foreign affairs and defense. We talked to him at Zagreb airport on his way back to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seemed to us that he was satisfied and in good spirits. During our conversation some good news arrived from the Doboj front. There were many reasons to be optimistic. Our first question referred to the recent military victories in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Delic] First of all, I would like to congratulate all the fighters, who have achieved significant results. Before leaving, I took part in planning the operations and issuing orders. In the morning of 9 September, when I set off, the 5th and the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in coordination with the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Croatian Army, started the operations. Everything is in line with the Split Declaration. Significant shifts have been achieved on the ground. I expected some towns to be liberated, but I must say that some of the other fronts have been a pleasant surprise. Two months ago I already knew that there would be a total change. I said that our time was to come and that we had to be patient and persistent. We had been inflicting heavy losses on the aggressors and they are now in a situation that they cannot come up with even the smallest reserves. We had been waiting for the moment when somewhere, owing to our constant pressure, they would finally yield. And this has happened. Things are now going from good to better, even better than expected.

Better Position for Negotiations

[Kaurin] Some of the liberated towns are not in the Contact Group plan. Will you, if the Bosnian authorities are asked to do so, return them to the Serbs?

[Delic] I am not sure that the plan of the international community is current at all. Since I became the commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, this is the fourth or fifth plan and none has been implemented. There have been many maps, but they are made on the ground. Our role is to do our job in line with the decisions of the state leadership, and those who have drawn up one, two, or five maps will have to draw them up again. Times are changing and the situation is completely different now. The new military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has improved the negotiating positions of the state authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has a duty to make those negotiating positions even more favorable.

The international community has lacked the decisiveness to bring a just peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have not established mechanisms to bring about such a peace. The U.S. initiative had, I would say, a lobbying character at the beginning. They have been trying to check the situation on the ground so as to make a plan that basically does not differ from the Contact Group plan.

[Kaurin] Will the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army agree to the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo only for humanitarian aid? It seems that this present deblockade is only of a limited nature.

[Delic] For us this is no deblockade of Sarajevo. The siege of the city can only be considered lifted when there is a free flow of people and goods into it. Only when the city has electricity, a water supply, fuel, and telecommunications can we say that the city is free, provided that that the aggressor's forces around it have disappeared. The siege of Sarajevo has to stop. Until this is achieved, the siege of the city is not lifted. It is obvious that the aggressor does not want to withdraw his heavy weapons even after this 72-hour period given by NATO.

[Kaurin] The interruption of NATO air strikes is being directly associated with Russian pressure and threats. What do you think about this?

[Delic] It is obvious, if one wants to be neutral and not have a winner, then one has to look for a solution in the West's fear of Russia. These NATO air strikes have clearly shown that if there is the real will to do something, something will be done. These stories can only be a mask for the inexperienced.

To Reach Peace Through a Balance of Power

[Kaurin] What can you say about the conclusions of the conference of Islamic countries that has just finished?

[Delic] The conference in Kuala Lumpur is yet more evidence that the Islamic countries support the just fight of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina for freedom and peace. In line with the conclusions of the Geneva conference of the Islamic countries, it was said that the arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina should be lifted as soon as possible and that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should be sent arms for its self-defense. Resolutions were passed on the role of those Islamic countries who have soldiers within UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as on the participation of those countries in the Rapid Reaction Force. There was also a resolution not to allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to be sold short in the peace process.

[Kaurin] The media have broadcast that in Kuala Lumpur you asked the Islamic countries for weapons. Does that mean that you do not believe in the peace process?

[Delic] It was not exactly like that. The international community is obliged to enable every country to defend itself, so Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. Since the international community has not done this, we are asking those who can to help us, regardless of whether they are Islamic countries. The majority of Islamic countries are associated with NATO or with NATO members. Therefore it was not possible to ask them to give us heavy weapons. We want the Islamic countries that are members of NATO or that have friends in NATO to put pressure on the international community to lift the embargo.

[Kaurin] What weapons does Bosnian Army need to continue the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Delic] First of all, heavy weapons. In the last few days I have not been to the fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I am told that large quantities of weapons have been captured. We are just about to go to the fronts to see all this. We need the heavy weapons because of the balance of power. Europe is peaceful because of the balance of power. If the international community wants peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, it can only provide it by establishing the balance of power in this area, too.

Social Democrats: Amendment 84 'Legally Unfounded'

AU2009194795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina held a news conference in Sarajevo today.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly passed generalized conclusions that leave a free hand to the negotiating team and voice complete trust in it, Mustafa Resic, member of this party's presidency, said.

Speaking about Amendment 84 to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was promulgated at that session and which stipulates that, for the duration of the war, the assemblies of municipalities and local communities will elect deputies to the Chamber of Municipalities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, the Social Democratic Party is of the opinion that by the adoption of this amendment to the Constitution, the assembly promulgated a legally unfounded act.

Speaking about the incident connected to the Studio 99 independent radio and television station, Resic stressed that this incident was not insignificant, but a major political issue.

Deputies were also addressed by Milenko Banovic, member of the Social Democratic Party presidency, who said that, parallel to the liberating offensive of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, we should launch an offensive in all spheres of social life, especially to conquer new territories of democracy and affirm the law-governed state.

Akmadzic Views Federation, Presidency Status

AU2109111995 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 95 pp 30-31

[Interview with Mile Akmadzic, a member of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, by Ivan Sabic; place and date not given: "Herzeg-Bosnia Will Not Go Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a member of the delegation that represented the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mile Akmadzic has taken part in many rounds of tripartite peace negotiations organized by Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and Thorvald Stoltenberg. He has also participated in many preparatory meetings that resulted in the signing of the Washington Treaty. In his political career he has discharged numerous offices in the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and in the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the office of the prime minister of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and today he is a member of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in charge of confederal relations.

All the business regarding the establishment of the Federation and its confederation with Croatia is overshadowed by the U.S. initiative, so that the public has somewhat lost track of events.

[Sabic] It would be interesting to hear your opinion of the present situation. In that regard what can we expect in the future?

[Akmadzic] The Federation has suffered from certain teething troubles, which is inevitable in the realization of such a project, and it is still suffering today, but nobody can say that it has ever come to a serious standstill. All contacts between the Croats and the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina have gone on without interruption as well as the contacts between the representatives of the leaderships of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, which are additional stimuli to the development of the Federation. In that regard, the present situation is good, the agreements and cooperation in the military field have been a good example, so in that regard great results have been achieved, and it has strongly influenced the political situation and the state of mind of the people, so that also the Croats and the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina understand that mutual relations as defined by the Constitution of the Federation are a good solution. I think that it is a major contribution to the political solution to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is true. Many questions remain open, particularly those that have to be solved on the ground, from the establishment of the municipalities to the establishment of the central government in line with the Constitution of the Federation, but those problems are not so big as to make it impossible to assert that the Federation has been making constant progress.

There Is No Federation Without Confederation

[Sabic] And what is the situation now with the confederation?

[Akmadzic] We usually look at it as associated with the Federation, and we say that there is no federation without confederation. I think it is very important that the confederation, besides the Croatian and Bosniak leadership, is also supported by the international community. There are not many good solutions to ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the confederation is generally agreed to be a good solution.

[Sabic] It is interesting that the U.S. initiative does not mention the confederation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Does that mean that there has been a change in U.S. policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Akmadzic] I would not say that there has been any change. Simply, the point in question is that, within the Washington Treaty, as well as on the occasion of finishing that project and turning to the Constitution of the Federation, questions regarding the Federation and confederation were treated separately. The priority was to settle the dispute between the Croats and the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only then did they start to think about the confederal links between what was created as a solution to that question, and the Republic of Croatia. After all, the relevant documents were signed independently of each other.

Six Months Is Insufficient

[Sabic] The envisaged six-month period, which expired almost a year ago, proved to be too short, and the process of establishing the Federation has not yet finished, but it seems as if nobody is concerned about it. Can the end of the (extended) transitional period be seen on the horizon?

[Akmadzic] Six months was really too short a period. That was the period set, but it proved unrealistic in practice, although within that period several important initial agreements were achieved, the Constitutional Assembly started to work, as well as the other institutions of authority. In the meantime different views appeared, primarily regarding personnel, so as to reach, in the end, an agreement acceptable to both sides. The question of the functioning of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains unresolved, so that today our topic is the talks on the start of its full legitimate functioning. I personally think that, after the question of military cooperation and the establishment of the federal armed forces, this question is the most important for the development of relations within the Federation, and that it will be solved very soon.

[Sabic] What could be the form of that solution? When we talk about the Government of the Republic/ Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it seems that Zubak and Bicakcic in their contacts reached an agreement on the creation of the federal government onto which the Assembly of the Republic will transfer the authorities of the Government of the Republic. Is something similar going to be done with the Presidency and president?

[Akmadzic] I think a solution such as you mention could be reached. It is, of course, too early to talk about it. First we must achieve political agreement, and then the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have to discuss it. We must bear in mind that those questions are not at all simple, and that there will have to be exhaustive talks until some kind of solution is found. Even before the agreement on the Federation with the Bosniak leadership we had had detailed discussions on the functioning of the Presidency. We had agreed on some options to solve that question. The suggested formula was "3 + 3 + 3," that is equivalent representation in the Presidency, we signed a document on this, but it has never taken effect. This has all reached a situation that demands new solutions, I think that it is possible to find a solution acceptable to both sides, and that it should be sought in the unification of the bodies of authority of the Republic and the Federation. In this, the Republic would gradually lose its functions, and its role would be taken over step by step by the Federation, regardless of its formal name.

To Reconstruct the Presidency

[Sabic] Could there be any problems because the Muslim side has practically reconstructed the Republic according to their own ideas through the assembly resolutions, adopted in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina practically consisting of only one nation?

[Akmadzic] The Croatian side does not agree with some resolutions adopted in that way. These include, of course, the appointment of the new members of the Presidency and the introduction of acting members of the Presidency. The Muslim side is obviously finding some provisory solutions for the political and organizational difficulties they face, and which are most frequently associated with the functioning of the Presidency. I can openly say that of all institutions of state authority the Presidency has today the least legitimacy. Since the end of 1992, the Croatian side has advocated the opinion that the Presidency, as the highest organ of state authority, should be reconstructed through an agreement of all three nations and thus it should be given its full legitimacy. At the beginning of March 1993, in New York, and then, in May 1993, in Medjugorje, we reached some solutions with the representatives of the Bosniak people, I think those were very good solutions, but they have never taken effect, primarily because of the hesitation of the Bosniak side. The Presidency today has a very varied structure in the way each member was appointed to it, certain members have not been elected at all, so that it would be necessary to start looking for a way to overcome that problem.

[Sabic] Muslim leaders, nevertheless, see a far bigger problem in the further existence of Herzeg-Bosnia, and they predict that from 1 January the Federation will start to function officially, and that Herzeg-Bosnia will disappear. Will that happen?

[Akmadzic] First of all, the Bosniak side looks at Herzeg-Bosnia in the wrong way. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is not a state, it has never asked for international recognition, it does not even have its own Constitution. It is, I would say, a state and legal institution, an aspect of the organization of Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is formed so that the people can protect themselves from aggression. If we look at Herzeg-Bosnia in that way, then things become clear, but the Bosniak side thinks that it is a state, it thinks that Herzeg-Bosnia wants to secede and therefore they want its extinction. Nevertheless, I think that Herzeg-Bosnia will not disappear. It will change in the course of time into a form that will be suitable for Croatian people in the given circumstances. What this form will be, it is presently hard to say. They will, naturally, depend upon the way Bosnia-Herzegovina is organized, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, must transform itself in line with the needs of the nations who live in it.

International Arbitration Only in Extremis

[Sabic] Do you expect the cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs in that reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they will finally accept the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a common state of the three nations?

[Akmadzic] Regardless of what the political solutions turn out to be, there will still be three constituent nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what their mutual relationship will be, it is presently impossible to envisage. The Croats and the Bosniaks have found a model that is suitable for them, and the Serb side has only to explain itself. In fact, the Serb people should explain themselves because there are different options within that nation that become daily more obvious, and there are those who advocate the linking of the Serb nation to a form of common existence within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many opportunities have been opened in that regard by the Contact Group plan and the Washington Treaty.

[Sabic] Some commentaries claim that of the controversial issues that appeared when the Federation was established and were left to international arbitration, in the majority of cases Muslim interpretations of the Constitution proved to be more correct. Do you agree with that?

[Akmadzic] I would not list all the cases or estimate who is more and who less right, but the statement that arbitration had always favored the Bosniak opinion is groundless. International arbitration is a need in extremis, and it would be much better if the two nations could agree upon everything without it. Arbitration judges exclusively upon the Constitution and other documents, it interprets them, but it cannot give a political solution. A political solution can only be given by the leaderships of the two nations. I believe that the gradual bringing together of the two nations, primarily through common defense against aggression, will enable all the controversial questions to be solved through agreements rached in direct contacts without any arbitration.

Croat, Government Forces Surround Banja Luka

AU2009174295 Paris AFP in English
1714 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 20 (AFP)—With the pause in fighting announced in northern Bosnia by the Croatians, the Croats and Bosnians have established front lines on three sides of Banja Luka, the biggest Serb-held town in Bosnia.

To the north, the Croatian Army is operating on Serb-controlled land in Bosnia along the River Sava, which marks the border with Croatia proper. The front line stretches from Bosanska Dubica south west to Bosanski Novi—renamed Novigrad by the Bosnian Serbs—passing through Bosanska Kostajnica.

This circular arc northwest of Banja Luka stretches from between 50 kilometres (31 miles) to 70 kilometres (43 miles) from the town.

To the west, operations are run from Bihac by the Bosnian Army's Fifth Corps.

The front line stretches from Bosanski Novi to Sanski Most, 40 kilometres (25 miles) west of Banja Luka, taking in Prijedor 42 kilometres (26 miles) west-north-west of Banja Luka, on a trail following the River Sana.

Prijedor and Sanski Most are between the two forks of the river.

To the south, Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) and the Croatian Army's crack Fourth and Seventh Brigades are pushing the offensive.

The battlelines continue from Sanski Most southeast to Jajce, 50 kilometres (31 miles) south of Banja Luka. It follows a line between Sanski Most and Kljuc, 40 kilometres (24 miles) west-south-west from Banja Luka. At this level there is a strong advance towards the east and the Croatians hold the southern half of the Manjaca plateau.

It is here that the two lines are closest to the town, some 25 kilometres (15.5 miles) away, on the Velika Greta side, 1,239 metres (40,887 ft) up. The United Nations says the closest Croatian artillery is only 15 kilometres (nine miles) from Banja Luka.

From there, the front line comes down again moving south up to Mrkonjic Grad, 40 kilometres south of Banja Luka, which is still Serb controlled, and along some of the main road from Kljuc to Jajce for a distance of five to 10 kilometres. —In the southeast part of the pincer formed around Banja Luka, the Bosnian Army's Seventh Corps controls the line linking up Jajce to the Vlasic plateau 60 kilometres southeast of Banja Luka.

This advance started with the taking of Donji Vakuf in central Bosnia, 72 kilometres south east of Banja Luka.

Agreement on Joint Use of Bihac Airfield Viewed

LD2009182295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Based on decisions of the two governments, an ad hoc commission for the temporary demarcation of territory in the area of Bihac airfield and its temporary use, was set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia today. The commission is to be chaired by Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador [to Croatia] Kasim Trnka and Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Simonovic.

The commission has concluded that Bihac airfield—Zeljava—which straddles the Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia border—will be jointly used by both states. The commission will establish the temporary demarcation of territory in the area of the airfield and conditions for its joint temporary use until a joint diplomatic commission of the two states has demarcated the entire state border.

Conclusions of the ad hoc commission do not constitute an advance determination of the final solution of the interstate demarcation, which will be determined by the joint diplomatic commission.

HDZ: Croats Control 22 Percent of Bosnia

LD2009172895 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia
in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Defense Council, including the latest successes achieved by the Croat forces, currently controls approximately 22 percent of the overall territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats' position in Bosnia-Herzegovina has never been better, Dario Kordic, chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina [HDZ B-H] said at a working meeting with members of the HDZ B-H committee of Zepce and Bobovac county [Bosnian Croat enclave in central Bosnia] yesterday.

Kordic also said that the HDZ B-H leadership lent its full support to a decision made by members of this committee not to take part in a session of the assembly of the Zepce and Bobovac county, which was unilaterally convened by the Party of Democratic Action.

This meeting—which was held after a session of the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—was also attended by HDZ B-H Secretary General Zdenko Cosic; Ivan Bender, president of the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; Perica Jukic, deputy prime minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; Mariofil Ljubic, chairman of the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Mato Tadic, minister of justice of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

Members of the county committee again briefed the leadership about problems in this area, laying particular stress on the problems of evicted Croats from Zenica who are now staying in the Lasva river valley; the problem of relocating Mojahed formations El-Mojahed from the Croat suburb of Podbrijezja; the problem of the flow of goods and people in Usora; the ban on holding Croatian classes in schools; interrogation of Usora Croats by Muslim authorities in Tesanj, and a series of problems in Vares.

President Kordic said that talks between leaderships of the HDZ B-H and the Party of Democratic Action would be held in around 10 days when solutions for the above-mentioned problems will be sought. Bender said that government members would pay a visit as soon as possible to the contentions areas and try to find the best solution on the spot.

Zenica-Doboj Canton Established; HDZ Absent

AU2009192995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[Report by Sefik Mujkic on the constituent session of Zenica-Doboj Canton in Zenica on 20 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In his address at the beginning of today's constituent session, Vedrudin Salcinovic, chairman of the Zenica-Doboj coordinating committee for the implementation of the federation's constitution, apart from a detailed chronological breakdown of the activities that led to the establishment of the municipal authorities, emphasized that the final ruling by the international arbiter, Roberts Owen, was binding for all sides and that [words indistinct] of this session. Three letters to the [word indistinct] county committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] had no effect, but the failure of their deputies to turn up did not influence the legality of discussion and decisionmaking.

The constitution of Zenica-Doboj Canton and the rules of procedure were passed and all the necessary commissions were also elected, among them also the mandate-immunity commission, which concluded that a sufficient number of deputies was present. Ahmed Alicic from Doboj was unanimously elected the assembly chairman while Vedrudin Salcinovic, who held leading posts in Zenica for many years and is a deputy in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, became the first president of Zenica-Doboj Canton. [passage omitted]

Taking part in the work of the constituent assembly of the Zenica-Doboj Cantonal Assembly and congratulating the newly elected officials, Edhem Bicakcic, acting member of the state presidency and vice president of the federation, emphasized that we have got our fifth canton, by which half the work for the realization of the federal constitution has been completed. He added:

[Begin Bicakcic recording] At the same time, I regret that the representatives of the HDZ are not present. It would be good if they were. However, the procedure was honored in its entirety. We must simply go forward, and we expect that they will join us. We have received such promises. I often say that we are even willing to make two or three steps ahead of them and let them catch up with us, because the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is a strategic interest of the Bosniak people and we will not diverge from this path. We are not afraid, and we confidently meet all the challenges that this project brings. We are confident because we believe that we have people who can realize it. [end recording]

The meeting was also addressed by Mirsad Ceman, secretary general of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and chairman of the federal coordinating committee for the implementation of the constitution of the federation, who voiced his satisfaction with this major step in the continuity of the creation of the federation, within which Zenica-Doboj Canton represents the backbone of Bosnia and from which much is expected in the future.

Milosovic Reportedly Anxious To Stay Out of War

MS2109080595 London INDEPENDENT in English 21 Sep 95 p 10

[Report by Tony Barber: "Pursuit Of Power Likely To Keep Milosevic Out of The Battle"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Malcolm Rifkind, the Foreign Secretary, is among those who have raised the prospect this week that a Muslim-Croat attempt to capture the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka could provoke Serbian military intervention in the war.

Banja Luka, the largest city in Bosnian Serb hands, is said to be of such strategic and economic importance that Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic could not permit its fall.

However, the fears of Mr Rifkind and other Western officials may be exaggerated. All the evidence since last May when the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia began to suffer their string of stunning defeats, suggests that Mr Milosevic is keen to remain out of the war.

He did nothing to save the Croatian Serb enclave of western Slavonia when the Croats overran it in early May. He did nothing to save Krajina when it fell to the Croats in early August, although that defeat resulted in the flight of 150,000 Serbs and the collapse of a centuries-old Serb civilisation.

Mr Milosevic has done nothing to prevent the Croatian army, the Bosnian Croats and the Muslim-led Bosnian government forces from taking such large tracts of territory from the Bosnian Serbs that they now appear to control more than half of Bosnia. These losses have resulted in an exodus of almost 100,000 Serbs but Mr Milosevic appears unperturbed.

After Nato began its aerial offensive against the Bosnian Serbs on 30 August, the Serbian leader confined himself to requests that the military campaign should stop. In fact during a period in which his Croatian and Bosnian Serb brethren have suffered some of the most severe humiliations in Serb history, Mr Milosevic has stayed well out of the way, preferring to negotiate a peace deal with US envoys than to charge into the war.

Diplomats and Serbian sources in Belgrade suggest that the one thing that might trigger Serbian military action is a Croat attempt to recapture eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-held region of Croatia.

Significantly, when Richard Holbrooke, the US negotiator, announced a diplomatic breakthrough in peace talks at Geneva on 8 September, he pointed out that no agreement had been reached on eastern Slavonia. The Serbian leader has been pressing for eastern Slavonia to be put under some form of international supervision for a period of five years or so. This has the advantage, from Mr Milosevic's point of view, of delaying the restoration of Croatia's authority over the region and allowing a breathing space in which an opportunity might arise to assert Serbia's control.

Knowing this, Croatia is insisting that a transitional period for eastern Slavonia should last only a year, and that there must be no obfuscation of the central point that the region belongs to Croatia. Serb procrastination, the Croats warn, will merely result in the recapture of eastern Slavonia by force.

Mr Milosevic's nationalist critics in Serbia have rained abuse on him for his supposed betrayal of the Serbs, but with his tight control of the media police force and bureaucracy in Serbia, he has suppressed domestic opposition.

The last real challenge to his authority was mounted in March 1991, when tens of thousands of demonstrators massed in Belgrade and Mr Milosevic was forced to bring in the tanks. This year he has treated his foes with contempt, imprisoning one of his main nationalist rivals, Vojislav Seselj, and paying no attention at all to the fragmented liberal opposition.

Of course, the fall of Krajina and the displacement of almost 250,000 Serbs in less than two months was not what Mr Milosevic had in mind when he launched his bid in 1990-91 to build a state incorporating all Serbs wherever they lived. But now it seems that a peace settlement is of more value to him than the vain pursuit of the Greater Serbian dream.

Partly, this is because it will ensure the lifting of UN sanctions, although Serbian propagandists and many Western commentators have exaggerated the damage caused to the Serbian economy. The most important sanction is the denial of hard-currency credits, without which the renewal of Serbian industry will be impossible.

Another important reason for Mr Milosevic's interest in peace is that he expects it to end Serbia's status as the outcast of, Europe. As the largest of the Yugoslav successor states, Serbia could play a powerful regional role in the future, but it needs to lose the tag of international pariah.

Ultimately, Mr Milosevic's main concern is to stay in power. He has achieved this goal at enormous cost—above all, the collapse of historic Serb lands in Croatia—but he has never lost sight of his objective.

Plavsic Criticizes Croatian Army Aggression

AU2009144195 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Aggression and Not Drawing of Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "What the Army of the Republic of Croatia is doing at the moment, I am referring to their aggression on the southern part of [Bosnian] Krajina, that is, on the territories of the Serb Republic [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina], best proves that there are no maps. Speculation that the Croatian Army is actually taking the territories that are already envisaged as its own according to a certain map is completely groundless, because, had this map existed, would Croatian troops perish on territory that they know will belong to them anyway after a political settlement? This is completely illogical," Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, said.

"So what do I believe to be the reason for their aggression, which truly is aggression. Namely, following their involvement, this is no longer an interethnic war but an aggression of one country's army against another country. The reason is that they have sensed that the Serbs have been weakened in a situation where they have to fight the Muslim-Croatian coalition in Bosnia while NATO is involved in bombing, and they have decided to draw up maps in advance by grabbing as much territory as possible."

Dr. Biljana Plavsic commented on the statement by Malcolm Rifkind [British Foreign Secretary] as follows:

"Among the information coming from the front, this statement may have gone unnoticed, but it is truly significant. Rifkind stated that the territories conquered in this aggression would not influence the territorial solution, that is, that these territories would have to be returned. This statement came at the right time. Had somebody from the American side said this, I would not have paid much attention to it because the Americans issue statements liberally. However, this is the British foreign secretary speaking, a minister who was previously defense secretary. The English are very wary of making statements; however, when they do make them, it is agreed at the highest level. This accurately reflects the stance of Great Britain toward this Croatian aggression. If one follows the English within the Western coalition, which is truly very biased and one-sided, they have acted as objectively as possible from the very beginning. Therefore, this statement carries weight. The war, too, is definitely nearing its end. Because a peace conference is at hand, everything must be wrapped up relatively quickly and with this statement the British Foreign Secretary made it clear to the Western public that the aggression of the Republic of Croatia, carried out at a time when the Serbian side was under unprecedented pressure from various sides, would not be acknowledged in the territorial talks. If we had only the Croatian-Muslim coalition as our foe we would have held on just as hitherto in the four years. Serb soldiers and the Serb army, too, really surpass our enemies. History will show, I believe, that no single nation has been under such pressure as we Serbs are now. However, we must endure it all. I expect that a Serb soldier will demonstrate his innate spitefulness, his resistance borne in the face of real injustices, when his land is being taken away from him. I can just picture a soldier from Drvar or from [Bosanski] Petrovac. I would bring precisely these men to see the ustashas [World War II Croatian fascists] strolling around Drvar and Petrovac and this would be enough to provoke a fearful revolt within them. This cannot be explained or tolerated. These are not territories where the Serbs formed a relative majority; these territories, Serbian [Bosansko] Grahovo, Drvar, and Petrovac, have been 100-percent Serb for centuries. These are ethnically the purest Serb territories in all the Serbian lands and it was precisely this that motivated the enemy to strike at the Serbs where they are the most vulnerable. I believe that it will be precisely the revolt of Serb soldiers that will decide on the return of Drvar, Petrovac, Kljuc, etc."

Dr. Biljana Plavsic said about the realization of an activity by the commissariat for the accommodation and receipt of refugees :

"I believe it is normal for civilians to be evacuated. Why should they be subjected to all this firing and artillery? Also, it puts our soldier in a more difficult situation in the defense sense because he has to think about the civilians. Something strange is happening to the Serbian warrior in this war, which I cannot explain. I recall World War II: Refugees and evacuations were something normal on these purely Serbian territories, too. Evacuations were recommended to spare the civilians and to allow the liberating army to function in a clear-cut situation and face the enemy directly. What kind of a soldier is a man who can only defend his family? He must defend his territory, his fatherland. He will bring his family back when he has liberated this territory and when firm borders have been drawn. Unfortunately, I must say that there were cases of our soldiers fleeing ahead of the civilians, which is a phenomenon hitherto unknown in the history of Serbian warfare."

Disinformation and the spreading of panic have obviously become a speciality of our enemies. Dr. Plavsic says of this:

"NATO helped them destroy all our communications, whose destruction caused us damage. Furthermore, a media war started parallel to all this. It has become easier to spread disinformation in our region. I must congratulate our media for finding its feet so quickly in the present situation. However, I would make another suggestion concerning our refugees and all these convoys that are running according to the schedule set by the refugee headquarters, namely, that it would be good if these convoys were accompanied by a vehicle with a loudspeaker which would dispel disinformation, Dr. Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, said on a program of Srpski Radio Banja Luka.

Koljevic: Army Offensive 'Impedes' Peace Process

AU2109100795 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement for Serb Radio, Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] vice president Nikola Koljevic said that the latest aggression of Croat-Muslim forces against the Serb Republic impedes the peace process in former Bosnia.

Our forces are being consolidated, both in the western and the southern part of the republic, but if the international community fails to intervene, primarily by putting pressure on the Croat-Muslim coalition, the escalation of war will obstruct the peace conference and that is in nobody's interest, said Koljevic. He added that former Bosnia has become the litmus test for the Cold War and reminded that Russian President Boris Yeltsin mentioned that possibility. It is up to the international community to make the next move and it will not be able to maintain the image of neutrality unless it stops the Croat-Muslim aggression against the Serb Republic. Furthermore, I do not believe it will be possible to restore the peace process in that case, stated Vice President Koljevic.

Commenting on Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha's visit to Moscow, Koljevic said that this visit, as well as every contact with potential allies, is of major significance and added that, having seen what happened to the Serbs here, the Russian Federation has realized that the same could happen there as well. Russia is aware—and statements of Russian officials reflect that—that the developments in former Bosnia jeopardize the concept of the so-called Partnership for Peace, for NATO appears as the only force and a militant one to boot, said Koljevic.

Koljevic on Sacirbegovic Banja Luka Statement

LD2009155195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1413 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 20 Sep (TANJUG)—In Geneva, at the sole official meeting of the international community, no mention was made of the possibility of the western parts of the Serb Republic, ethnically and historically a Serb territory, and especially Banja Luka, becoming part of the Muslim-Croat Federation, Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, said in Banja Luka today. He thus denied a statement to Croatian media by Muhamed Sacirbegovic, minister of foreign affairs in the Muslim-Croat Federation, that an agreement was reached in Geneva for Banja Luka to become part of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Koljevic added that not only were details not discussed but no territorial issues were mentioned either.

"In any case the world public was told about the principles agreed at the meeting," he said.

"The Croatian TV reported other inaccuracies. It said that the Croatian troops had entered Prijedor and Sanski Most, but our TV footage denied these reports," Koljevic said.

Under the alleged Geneva agreement—and Sacirbegovic failed to say when and with whom it had been agreed—Banja Luka authorities are being called upon to accept dialogue with the Muslim regime in Sarajevo.

This call was described by Predrag Radic, the head of the Banja Luka local authority, as ridiculous, and he rejected any separate negotiations about individual parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Throughout the last four years not a single Banja Luka official has had talks about issues that come under the jurisdiction of the Serb Republic's negotiating team, despite attempts to involve them," he said.

Reacting to claims, again by Sacirbegovic, that the population of Banja Luka is allegedly fleeing the town ahead of the Muslim offensive, Radic said that the population of Banja Luka and the surrounding area have no intention of going anywhere. "Under the Geneva agreement, citizens of Banja Luka will have the same status as Serbs expelled from towns under Muslim control, but it is not appropriate to discuss this now," he said.

Milovanovic Denies Deal To Surrender Banja Luka

*BR2009140595 Madrid EFE in Spanish
1915 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[Unattributed report: "Serb General Calls Rumors on Surrender of City 'Nonsense'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Sep (EFE)—General Manojlo Milovanovic, Bosnian Serb chief of staff, today (Tuesday 19 Sep) called the rumors on the existence of a secret agreement to surrender Banja Luka, the main Bosnian Serb city, to the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation 'nonsense.'

"I know that the [Serb] Army together with the people, that is, all of us, we will defend this area until the last moment, and I assure you, with success," said the general.

Two weeks ago the Muslim troops, in coordination with the Bosnian Croats and with the help of the Croatian Army, launched an offensive in Western and Central Bosnia toward the North, approximately 70 km South and 90 km West of Banja Luka.

"We must resist, defend the most important, most precious, and most populated part of the 'Serb Republic' (of Bosnia), because we do not have the right to dishonor our ancestors and to destroy the future of our descendants," Milovanovic insisted.

He said that the front in Western Bosnia is "stabilizing itself" and that "the enemy has lost its initial power. As a result the Bosnian Serb Army has won the latest fights with Croatian and Muslim troops."

The UN Security Council yesterday (Monday 18 Sep) demanded that the Croatian and Muslim troops stop their offensive, fearing that it might block the progress obtained in the negotiation process.

"They want to enter Banja Luka, Kozara, and Lijevce Polje (mountain and valley North of the city) and they would like to occupy the whole of the Serb Republic," said Milovanovic, but "we the Bosnian Serbs will stay here and we will defeat our enemy militarily."

Serb Official: 'Disinformation' About Mladic

*AU2009203895 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 14*

[Article by R.K.: "Without Changes in the Leadership of the Army of the Serb Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nothing significant has changed in the military hierarchy of the Serb Republic [RS]. Colonel General Ratko Mladic is still the commander of the General Staff of the VRS [Army of the Serb Republic]. He is currently receiving treatment at the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade.

This is the essence of the information obtained from Danilo Dursum, director of the RS Bureau in Belgrade. He has categorically rejected as disinformation and speculation all other explanations of Mladic's absence from the front.

According to the established practice, Lt. Gen. Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the General Staff, who has recently been mainly on the western front, is deputizing for Mladic. As we have learned, Lt. Gen. Milan Gvero, assistant commander of the General Staff in charge of morale and legal issues, and Lt. Gen. Djordje Djukic, assistant commander for the rear area, as well as Major Gen. Zdravko Tolimir, assistant commander of military security, are all performing their regular duties.

Speculation about alleged "changes" is based, it appears, on the aftermath of attempts by Pale to disband the General Staff of the VRS and replace Gen. Mladic. One must remember that, at that time, this was considered by the generals as unauthorized interference in military affairs. This was the reason for invented stories about a military coup and for generals being divided into honorable and dishonorable ones.... The military leadership, which at that time expressed a high degree of solidarity with Mladic, stresses that the state is only being asked to take the best care of the fighters, repeating for the umpteenth time that a stop must be put to deserters and profiteers. The generals who signed this (commanders of the corps and divisions, as well as chiefs of staff of certain branches, services, and institutions), as far as is known, are still performing their regular duties.

"The truth is that Gen. Mladic had to go to hospital because of severe pains allegedly caused by kidney stones. I am going to visit him tomorrow myself, Danilo Dursum, director of the RS Bureau said."

It is known that the command structure of the VRS has been very stable. Hasty moves, such as replacements and removals, have been very rare. Regarding personnel changes, there is only a record of Gen. Galic being replaced as the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps by Gen. Milosevic. The former Drina Corps Commander Zivanovic assumed another post after he had been seriously wounded in the fighting. He was replaced by Gen. Arsic. Gen. Boric, former commander of the 2d Corps, is now head of the Center of Military Schools. His predecessor, Gen. Slavko Lisica, is in retirement.

Izetbegovic Urges Tudjman To Ensure Assembly Seat

LD2009121995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Sep 95

["Full text" of letter sent by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on 20 September—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Bosniak nation in the Republic of Croatia have informed me that the Chamber of Deputies of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia is debating a bill on electoral units for the Chamber of Deputies. According to this bill and other electoral laws, it is envisaged that the national minorities in the Republic of Croatia in particular wards should elect seven deputies to the Assembly Chamber of Deputies—Serbs three, Italians one, Hungarians one, Czechs and Slovaks one, and Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Austrians one deputy. Not a single seat in the Assembly is envisaged for the Bosniak national minority on this basis, although Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Croatia guarantees the equality of all nations and minorities. The Bosniak nation in Croatia, according to the population census of 1991, is the second largest national minority.

Kindly use the means at your disposal to suggest to the proposers of the law that Bosniaks in Croatia should be given one seat in the Assembly Chamber of Deputies on the basis of the above principle. The possibility for this exists because, in accordance with Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the constitutional law on human rights and freedoms, there remains one unallocated deputy seat.

In the belief that our relations will continue to develop to the benefit of both our nations and states, I thank you for your understanding.

Russia's Ivanov Comments After Meeting Tudjman

LD2009134095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman received Igor Ivanov, first deputy of the Russian minister of Foreign affairs, this afternoon. Their meeting lasted for around half an hour, after which the Russian diplomat addressed journalists. Andjelko Perincic has a report:

[Perincic] As was expected, the talks between President Tudjman and the Russian diplomat focused on the resolution of the crisis in the region, particularly on the problem of currently occupied eastern parts of

[Ivanko in Russian, fading into Serbo-Croatian report] President Tudjman's decision to halt the Croatian Army's advance in Bosnia will certainly contribute to the peace solution. The Russian Federation is of the opinion that for the continuation of the peace process, it is necessary to halt all hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the course of the meeting, we examined several issues of the crisis related to the holding of an international conference on the solution of the crisis by peaceful political means. We also discussed the issue of Eastern Slavonia. This problem must be resolved actively and speedily.

Russia is making efforts to find a well-balanced solution which will be acceptable to all sides. This solution has to be a basis for peace, not a starting point for future conflicts. President Tudjman agreed with such a position. For the time being, we are not thinking about particulars, such as a possible departure of the Russian battalion from Eastern Slavonia; we are just committed to searching for a political solution, Mr. Ivanov said in conclusion.

Granic Vows Not To Prejudice Banja Luka Peace

LD2109090395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In agreement with the governments of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the government of the Republic of Croatia has decided to take no further action in the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would be conducive to conflict in Banja Luka, says a statement issued last night by Croatian Foreign Affairs Minister Mate Granic.

The possibility of finding a global, just, and prompt political solution to the problem in the region seems increasingly certain at present, Minister Granic says, adding that a joint statement made by Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic in support of the Washington agreement on the federation, that is, confederation, is an important step in advance of upcoming negotiations in New York.

Croatia will persevere in linking the regime of sanctions against the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the successful implementation of the contact group plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the successful reintegration of Baranya, eastern Slavonia and western Srem in Croatia, in line with the internationally recognized borders of all states which are successors to the Former Yugoslavia, Minister Granic's statement says.

Commentary Views Possibility of Bosnian Division

AU2009170395 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Sep 95 p 16

[Commentary by Srecko Jurdana]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only a political Einstein can predict what will happen with Bosnia. Ordinary analysts have recently been offered an exceptionally colorful spectrum of events as food for thought. According to optimists, with this spectrum, the war in Bosnia is definitely entering the final stage, while, according to the chronic skeptics, a new, equally serious future conflict is actually being crystallized in it. What options are in fact at play?

The Geneva agreement reached by the foreign ministers of the nonrecognized Yugoslavia, Croatia, and the mainly Muslim Bosnian Government in Sarajevo envisages, as is more or less known, the survival of Bosnia through its division into two entities, called the "Bosniak-Croat Federation" and the "Republika Srpska" [Serb Republic]. Both entities will have the right to establish "parallel special relations" with the neighboring countries, the Federation with Croatia and the Serb Republic with Serbia. The Federation will get 51 percent and the Serbs 49 percent of the territory of the "integral" state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Two Entities

The skeptics claim that such a strange concept of a whole that is realizing itself through its independent parts is not feasible, not only because it represents a contradiction in terms, but also because "the Bosniaks will never accept the partition of the state." However, this concept is backed by a superpower, which, by applying its enormous pressure, can often accomplish what appears to be impossible. After all, this is best illustrated by the effects of the NATO air strikes. Contrary to the Karadzic-Mladic claim that "the more you hit them, the stronger the Serbs are," the three-week NATO military operations led to the until-then unimaginable agreement on the withdrawal of Serb guns from around Sarajevo, albeit at the price of the announced arrival of Russian soldiers in Bosnia as the way to "protect the Serb population." Holbrooke's initiative on establishing two entities, strengthened with an accord on the Russian supervision of the areas that Serbs call the "Serb Sarajevo," implies that this might be a political operation of dividing Bosnia realized through the method of NATO strikes against the Serbs.

The Serbs are therefore no longer getting a "honorarium for the genocide," which the international community has been disgusted with for some time, but are getting bombs dropped on their heads. What they are going to get paid politically later will not appear in the form of bloody wounds but a "just peace." One should not fool oneself, however, that the demonstration of NATO's force over the past few days has not also been a warning to all the parties to the conflict. The message sent by the United States via the destruction of the Serb communications infrastructure is that they do indeed have the means to impose their own vision of Bosnia, that is to say, the vision that has been accepted by the international community as opportune. For this reason, it would be best for all the interested parties—even at the cost of a historic justice—to conform with this vision without wasting time.

Angelic Face

Croatia is certainly trying to behave as it has understood the message. At the same time, it is trying to profit from the possible complementary nature of the message and the concept of Bosnia's division, which dominated the Croatian official scene not that long ago. If the United States wants two entities, who are we to oppose them—the Croatian leadership asks with the angelic face, suggesting, without wasting any time, a possibility of exchanging Prevlaka for a part of eastern Herzegovina, the Dubrovnik hinterland (this was stated recently by Dr. Tudjman in the German magazine FOCUS). The public deliberation of exchanging Croatian for Bosnia-Herzegovina territory confirms, to say the least, very casual attitudes toward the possibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining an integral state. Connected with this is also the status of Fikret Abdic as a kind of Croatian "spare official for western Bosnia." He is waiting in some Zagreb or Rijeka resort, in line with his lifelong tradition, for the time when he will again be needed by someone.

In the meantime, as it appears, an intensive race has started between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina over the control of the 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia that they should get jointly according to the Geneva agreement. The HVO started a bit earlier and has taken Mt. Dinara as the base for its future advances toward central Bosnia. The Bosniaks are only waking up now and are trying with rapid maneuvers of the 7th Corps from the east and the 2d Corps from the west to compensate for their idleness and hesitation regarding the capturing of towns. So, as it happens, the Croats are already in Jajce, while the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is just entering Donji Vakuf, which, objectively speaking, could have been liberated earlier. It could be assumed that the Serb inclination to give land to the Croats rather the Bosniaks, if they have to withdraw from it, suits the speed of the Croat advance. First of all, the Croats in

Bosnia are not so thirsty for revenge and could, from the Serbs' point of view, form a kind of territorial shield for the "Republika Srpska" against parts of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that are primarily under the Bosniaks' control. Second, the Serbs are probably still hoping for a new Croat-Bosniak conflict and are trying to provoke it indirectly through territorial concessions within the 51 percent concept.

Banja Luka

Regardless of all the territorial alterations of Bosnia that are evidently in progress, a new Croat-Bosniak war must not happen at any cost. The survival of the Croat-Bosniak alliance is the precondition for reestablishing the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if this takes 20 years. This alliance would undoubtedly be best confirmed with the joint arrival of the HVO and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Banja Luka, although some geostrategists claim that NATO, the organization that is nominally disciplining the Serbs, would in fact not allow that to happen.

Commentary: Bosnia Should Reject U.S. Peace Plan

AU2009163495 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by Mario Galic: "Croatian Arms—The Main Factor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last two weeks, the military-strategic situation in Bosnia has changed fundamentally. First, the NATO aircraft began air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, and then, in Operation Maestral, the joint Croatian forces freed more than 2,000 square kilometers of territory in central Bosnia. At the same time, the Bosniak army freed Donji Vakuf and Kulen Vakuf, after which they linked up with the forces of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] at Bosanski Petrovac. Thus, a solid road link has finally been established between the 5th Corps in the Bihac area and the rest of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The liberation of Kljuc and Mrkonjic Grad (earlier called Varcar Vakuf) lies ahead. Thus the 2d Krajina Corps of the Serbian paraarmy has been completely crushed, which makes possible far greater breakthroughs into the depths of the occupied territory.

With the liberation of Jajce, the Croatian units have accomplished their most important goal in that part of Bosnia. The further freeing of that part of Bosnia should be completed by the Bosnian Army, primarily the 5th and 7th Corps. Therefore, the liberation of Kljuc is expected to take place soon, as well as a further advance toward Sanski Most. In the west, a large-scale offensive is expected to be undertaken by the 5th Corps toward Bosanski Novi and Prijedor. The final phase of this massive operation should be the linkup with the forces coming from the direction of Sanski Most and Petrovac. In that way, the large area around Mount Grmec will be freed. And not only that.

A Wedge as Deep as to Banja Luka

After the liberation of Jajce, the Croatian forces have reached within 50 km of Banja Luka. They are strong enough to free that city as well, if circumstances permit. The shortest and easiest direction of advance toward Banja Luka is via the Vrbas River valley. However, at the moment, the Serbs control a wide area on both banks of the river. That means that the Croatian forces would have to drive a very deep "wedge" toward Banja Luka, with very vulnerable flank positions. For that reason, it would be a very risky operation. All the more since the area is now being defended by the so-called 1st Krajina Corps, which has, for the most part, remained solid so far. If one wants to liberate Banja Luka in the distant future, then at least the left flank of the advance should be secured. That presupposes the aforementioned freeing of Sanski Most and Prijedor. Thus it may be that, together with the Croatian forces advancing from the south, the Bosnian Army forces will set out toward Banja Luka from the west. That this is quite feasible in the long run is shown by NATO's secret plans for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between into eastern Serbian part and the western Croatian-Bosniak part. In all this, NATO's analysts obviously assess that the liberation of Banja Luka would leave the Serbs without the entire Bosnian Posavina [Sava River basin]. Obviously, the decisive factor in such a course of events is the Croatian force, because NATO does not plan any major changes on the eastern front, because there are no considerable Croatian forces involved there. The only major advance is expected at Mount Ozren, where the successful offensive of the 2d and 3d Corps of the Bosnian Army is already underway. The final goals of this offensive are the thorough cleansing of Mount Ozren and the freeing of Doboj. Thus, on that part of the front, a relatively compact territory would be created, which would leave the Serbs with around 30 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, approximately as much as their proportion of the total population according to the 1991 census. For Croatia, it would be very satisfactory, because in such a way it would secure its borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the long run. However, such a course of events completely undermines the U.S. peace initiative and, indirectly, Clinton himself. Therefore, the United States will soon exert a strong pressure on Tudjman and Izetbegovic to give up any large-scale offensives. A different question is whether they would comply, because Holbrook's plan for Bosnia's partition is based on the Serbian military gains and the results of genocide. This is no surprise in view of the fact that the Clinton administration wants to establish peace in the former Yugoslavia at any price. That such a peace might precisely be the reason of some future wars does not concern the U.S. Administration—the important thing is to win the elections.

Look Out for One's Own Interests

If Clinton is looking out for solely his own interests, why would we not look out solely for our own interests as well? The chief interest of both the Croats and the Bosniaks is to accomplish a situation on the front in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would last for hundreds of years, rather than for the next two or three years (as long as the NATO forces are present). Therefore, we have to protect our own interests, rather than Clinton's. All the more since the U.S. Republicans support such a policy by Bosnia and Croatia. After all, Clinton has had precisely four years in which to do something. A policy of taking one's destiny in one's own hands will soon yield even better results. This is confirmed by the decision of 53 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which have decided not to comply with the UN arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is not at all an insignificant decision if one knows that, among those 53 states, there are the 10 richest countries in the world. Their political influence, particularly on the United States, is certainly not insignificant. Therefore, the decision on disregarding the arms embargo carries some weight.

In any case, the military balance of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina has changed fundamentally. Even if NATO calls off the air strikes completely, the Bosnian Serbs are no longer capable of offering resistance over an extended period. For that reason, the Bosniak government in Sarajevo should avoid any hasty acceptance of the various peace proposals, even if they come from the United States. After all, one such conferences, the one in Geneva, has resulted in the international recognition of the Serb Republic. Is that not a good enough warning for them?

Assembly Official Explains New 'Electoral Model'

AU1709125095 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Sep 95 p 7

[Report on interview with Vladimir Seks, deputy chairman of the Croatian Assembly, by O.R.; place and date not given: "Aim—Stable Multiparty System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Seks, deputy chairman of the Croatian Assembly and coauthor of the Electoral Law of 1992, is the author of the new electoral model for parliamentary elections. In an interview especially for SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, Vladimir Seks explained how the Presidium of his party has accepted the new electoral model, which meets the demands of the opposition set in 1992. The opposition demanded a greater degree of parliamentary proportional representation. Now, more than two-thirds of deputies in the Chamber of Representatives will be elected through a proportional system of voting.

The opposition's demand for the participation of the representatives of the ruling and the opposition parties in the work of the electoral commissions and electoral councils has also been met. The deadline for registering candidates has been extended from 12 to 14 days, too, which was also one of the opposition's demands.

In the reply to our question whether the electoral law in that respect suited the ruling party, Vladimir Seks said:

"This suits HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. What is also important, however, is that this is in the Croatian state and national interests, and that this will secure stable multiparty system."

Commenting on the objections for holding elections before the census, when it is said that one of the reasons for elections is the change in the demographic structure, Vladimir Seks says:

"The census cannot be conducted properly until the demographic picture stabilizes itself."

[O.R.] Will you take part in the elections as a candidate on the state list or will you run in your constituency?

[Seks] I will enter election as I did in the past, in my constituency.

Explaining some of the provisions of the amended law on elections, Vladimir Seks also answered the question of why three representatives of the Serb community in Croatia will be elected to the Chamber of Representatives.

"According to the official data of international institutions, especially UNHCR, some 300,000 citizens of Serb nationality have left Croatia, and if one knows that there were something over 580,000 of them before, three representatives would correspond to their percentage in the total population of Croatia."

According to Vladimir Seks, the figure of 12 representatives who will be elected from a special list was arrived at by assuming that some 10 percent of Croatian citizens do not have a place of abode, and 10 percent of 120 representatives in the Chamber of Representatives is 12. Those who have dual citizenship will also vote for candidates who appear on the special list. A special list can be proposed by a party or it must be signed by 500 voters.

Regarding substitutes [zamjenik] for the representatives, there are no changes with regard to the existing provisions of the electoral law. In other words, in every constituency every candidate will have a substitute, and therefore, the elected representative will have a substitute. On the state list of candidates, the substitutes for the representatives will be named by the proposer of the list. The law does not stipulate that this must be the next candidate on the list.

Appointment of Electoral Commission Members

LD2009185495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have received a statement from the office of the president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia on the appointment of the Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia. [passage omitted]

The Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia is made up as follows: Dr Krunislav Olujic, chairman of the Electoral Commission; Alenka Brtljacic-Radancevic, Stanko Hauc, Vladimir Separovic, and Mladen Turkalj are members of the Electoral Commission; Jakob Miletic is standby chairman of the Electoral Commission; Boris Gutman, Branko Hrvatin, Zeljko Oreskovic, and Miljenka Pajalic are standby members of the Electoral Commission. [passage omitted]

Seks Gives Rationale for Lower House Dissolution

LD2009143195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the end of its 28th session, the Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian Assembly passed a decision disbanding itself. We have a report by Jasenka Dudic:

[Dudic] The decision, which received written support from 72 deputies, was explained on behalf of the HDZ [ruling Croatian Democratic Union] deputy club by Vladimir Seks, chairman of the HDZ deputy club and vice president of the Chamber of Deputies:

[Begin Seks recording] The explanation rests on the fact that since the Chamber of Deputies was set up, party representation in it has considerably changed, and that behind the change are 24 deputies who are named in the explanation paper you have in front of you. This has also resulted in important changes in relations to the electoral body and the composition of the parliament. For these reasons I propose, on behalf of 72 HDZ deputies, that, in the view of changes in the demographic situation and various political reasons which have emerged since the Assembly was constituted, the Chamber of Deputies be disbanded to pave the way for fresh elections and to adjust its composition to reflect changes in the political situation. [end recording]

[Dudic] In the ensuing debate, several opposition deputies spoke against the decision and at the same time welcomed the elections. The decision to disband the Chamber of Deputies was adopted by 99 votes for and one against. [passage omitted]

Under the Constitution, the Republic's president sets the date for elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The elections will be organized in line with the electoral laws adopted today. The Chamber of Deputies will have 127 deputies; 28 will be elected by a relative majority, as will seven deputies representing national minorities; 80 deputies will be elected from the state lists by proportional representation; 12 deputies will be elected by Croatian citizens living abroad on the basis of special lists and by proportional representation. Under a special law, the state will be divided into 28 electoral units with about 130,000 voters each. [passage omitted]

Chamber of Deputies Changes Minorities Law

LD2009104095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After a session yesterday which went on late into the night, the Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian Assembly had to deal with only a small number of points on the agenda this morning.

Following a short debate the chamber adopted a law on deputies' rights, tabled by Deputy Zdenko Matesic. A vote was also taken on a draft law on a population census next year. The law was adopted by a majority vote.

The deputies also adopted a law abolishing some provisions of the minorities law.

A number of amendments to a draft of the electoral law regulating the election of deputies to the Croatian Assembly were rejected. In the end this law was adopted by a large majority of votes.

Party of Right Forms Electoral Pact With HRZ

AU2109132795 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 95 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Croatian Republican Community With Croatian Party of Right"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian Republican Community [HRZ] will join forces with the Croatian

Party of Right [HSP] at the coming elections, the leaders of the two parties said at the news conference yesterday.

As HRZ deputy chairman Mario Ostojic said, this cooperation was established because the two parties had many views in common, and because the HRZ did not want to break up the HSP vote. This cooperation would continue after the elections with a view to forming a moderate right. [passage omitted]

NHD Proposes 'Monarchistic Arrangement'

AU1809132395 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Sep 95 p 4

[Article by D. Krile: "New Croatian Right-Wing Movement Founded"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—After over a year of informal existence, actually of illegal work, there came to the founding assembly of the New Croatian Right-Wing Movement [NHD], which made this party a legal participant of the political life of Croatia. The founding assembly was held "in complete conspiracy," in the presence of around one hundred members and sympathizers—as the founder and present honorary president Mladen Schwartz told us.

According to his words, at the assembly they elected the members of the Triumvirate—the supreme body, which consists of Boris Stimac, Schwartz himself, and a person whose identity he did not want reveal, saying only that it is a former member of the parliament from 1990. The NHD will act as a nondemocratic party of strict internal arrangement.

Schwartz announced that the party will in the first place concentrate on the elimination of the rest of the opposition, which, as he said, has been "blown away" by the "Storm" [latest Croatian Army offensive] just like the rebel Serbs. "In the long run, we are against all parties, including the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], because we believe that Croatia has to act as an organic state with a class parliament which would consist of the representatives of Croatian class groups," Schwartz said. The other house of the Croatian parliament, according to the program of the NHD, would be regional, and it would consist of the representatives of "all Croat lands, including Bosnia, Dalmatia, Srijem, Backa, and Boka [Boka Kotorska]." The NHD came out with a program of returning to the historical Croatian borders in Zemun, and the proposal of a monarchistic arrangement of Croatia. "We are against the idea of giving Tudjman the title of a king, not because of himself, but because we believe that he has no heirs worthy of it," Mladen Schwartz concluded.

Army Steps Up Attacks in Srem-Baranja Region

LD2009153895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1439 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Sept. 20 (TANJUG)—Croatian Army has stepped up attacks against Serb positions in the Srem-Baranja region in clear violation of the latest ceasefire agreement, the local Serb command said Wednesday.

The 11th Corps of the Serb Krajina Army based in Vukovar said that Croatian forces fired from anti-aircraft guns near Bakanga in Baranja around 5 p.m. local time, and reported Croatian small arms fire at Ostrovo in eastern Slavonia shortly afterwards.

Serb forces responded to the attacks, the corps said in a statement.

At 1 a.m. on Wednesday, Croatian soldiers fired from small arms at Gradina in eastern Slavonia, the statement said and added that a 68-mm shell hit the village an hour later. Small arms fire was also reported near Sodolovci in eastern Slavonia around 1 a.m. The Serb side suffered no casualties in these attacks, the statement said.

The 11th Corps command said that several aircraft had been spotted flying over the area on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning and that they were probably Croatian pilotless reconnaissance planes.

The Serb side has lodged a protest with the U.N. peacekeepers over the intensified Croatian attacks, the statement said.

Serbs Prevent Attempts To Evict Vukovar Citizens

LD2009160195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1434 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 20 Sep (TANJUG)—Attempts at the forceful eviction of Croats, Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Serbs from Vukovar, Berak, and Svinjarevac have energetically been prevented, says a joint statement issued by the Council of the Srem and Baranja Region and Command of the 11th Corps of the Serb Krajina Army.

The statement says that a group of civilians, army officers, and members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs evicted 91 persons from these places on 17 September by using brute force.

Money, jewellery, and other things were taken from these persons after which they were transported to the Jelenovo-Nemetin border crossing with an intention to be sent to Croatia. This was prevented by the Serb military police which provided protection for these people, and returned them to their homes on 18 September.

The joint statement says that "initiators of this willful and illegal action were presidents of local communities who, without any consultations with official bodies, skillfully took advantage of emotions among the Serb population and relatives—refugees from the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina—to implement their plans of eviction, for personal gain."

In agreement with the Council of the region, the 11th Corps command has issued an order that all perpetrators of this action be detained, interrogated, and appropriately punished. The concrete responsibility of each individual will be examined; confiscated property will be returned to its owners.

"The 11th Corps Command and the Council of the Srem and Baranja Region most vehemently condemn this willful and illegal action, which most crudely compromises Serb authorities' commitment to secure observance of human rights of all citizens and their personal safety," the statement says.

President Receives U.S. Military Delegation

LD2009170395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1606 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 20 September (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today received a military delegation from the U.S. Defense Department led by Secretary of the Army Togo West, it was announced in Skopje.

President Gligorov welcomed the successful development of military cooperation between the two states. At the same time, he expressed the conviction that the establishment of full diplomatic relations will add a new dimension to the quality, "content, and dynamism" of cooperation in this field. As specified in the statement, "the U.S. side expressed readiness to promote the program of cooperation between the two armies" at bilateral and international levels.

The U.S. military delegation was today also received by FYROM Defense Minister Dragoljub Handziski. The talks were attended by Colonel General Dragoljub Bocinov, chief of general staff of the Macedonian Army. [passage omitted]

Minister Thanks Mediators of Greek Accord

AU2009161195 Skopje MIC in English 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After returning from New York on Sunday [17 September], the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] gave the following statement:

"Until now you attacked me that nothing has been said and that you don't know anything; now you do know everything, so it's even more difficult to give a statement. However, I think we really achieved a complete change of the situation in the southern part of the Balkans, maybe even the whole of the Balkans. I believe that all the speculations surrounding the Republic of Macedonia have definitely been stopped, as well as all opinions about the global solutions of some questions. That is the first great result.

"Secondly, we have the recognition from Greece, which is an important step forward because before all, every country is determined by the recognitions from the neighbors. I feel the foundations for the development of good relations have been laid, and I hope they will develop in the coming period.

"We should take this opportunity to thank the mediators in this dispute, foremost Mr. Cyrus Vance, who has been working tirelessly on settling this question for the past two and a half years, then Mr. Matthew Nimetz, special envoy of President Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and a line of European colleagues who took an active part in supporting us these past years, and countless other people, our friends from throughout the world.

"The second important thing is the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, that is to say, the first important thing, because it preceded the signing of the accord. We have had excellent relations so far as well; however, the future development of the relations has now been regulated formally.

"We had a truly terrific meeting with President Bill Clinton in the White House and his associates Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the adviser on national security Anthony Lake. We had a long and insightful discussion. We already have a lot of responses and calls from other countries, and this opens the way to many other activities of the Republic of Macedonia in the coming months."

Commissioner Praises Accord

AU2109065095 Skopje MIC in English 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the broad interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA today, the European Commissioner Hans Van den Broek says: "We hope this accord lays the foundations for a complete solution to the problem, including the question about the name, which is still the subject of discussion between both sides. However, we feel the atmosphere can be improved now, and that the contacts which can restart, can also develop in the direction of solving this problem.

"As for the European Union, I am prepared to propose to the Council of Ministers to start intensifying our relations. That means establishing diplomatic relations, but also, to see when we can prepare a contractual agreement on trade and cooperation, and to intensify our program for technical help. All of these are exceptionally important matters and I feel they will come as a reward to your country, which it is undoubtedly expecting."

Parliament To Discuss Flag

AU2009154095 Skopje MIC in English 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is trying to keep all the deadlines for the practical realization of the Macedonian-Greek accord, signed in New York, last week. The law on the coat of arms, i.e., the symbol on the flag should enter parliamentary procedure in two days, at the latest. According to the rules, the procedure should last at least 15 days, before the legal proposal could be placed before the

MPs, for adoption. Yesterday, a working meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry for the start of the practical realization of the accord, while similar meetings are scheduled to be held in the other competent ministries, as well as the government, tomorrow, or in the next couple of days. The aim of the meetings is to determine the schedule and dynamics, and to administer the tasks for the activities, in order to meet the deadlines.

The subject of these meetings, however, is not the accord itself, but an accompanying document, which is mentioned as a "side letter" for a longer time already, or as a memorandum. Its initiator is the Macedonian side which made a list of documents (such as passports, customs, transport and insurance documents, etc) which are internationally recognized and which Greece must not dispute in the communication with the Republic of Macedonia, regardless of how it will regulate that internally. Then, that list is handed to the American side, which drew up the memorandum on the basis of that, and included all the Macedonian demands in it. A less spectacular, but not less strenuous work of coordination is to follow now, as well as the practical resolution of the questions connected with the every-day normal communications between the two neighboring countries. In the process, as our diplomats say, it will be necessary to "open all four eyes" in order to foresee all the possible repercussions and "different interpretations" of the Greek side, which could come from each one of the agreed solutions.

Otherwise, the work surrounding the Macedonian-Greek accord is not entirely finished even in the United Nations which is acting as mediator. Namely, it is expected for the Secretary General Butrus-Ghali to officially inform the Council of Europe about the to-date results from the mediation. As we are informed, Butrus-Ghali gives appropriate space and attention to the report on the work of the world organization in the past year, in the part dedicated to the Republic of Macedonia, and the results from the preventive peace activities of the UN, and which will be read at the start of the jubilee 50th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Third Presidential Candidate Officially Registered

LD2009211795 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 20 Sep 95

[Relayed via Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazimierz Piotrowicz has become the third officially registered candidate for the office of president registered by the State Electoral Commission [PKW].

The 50-year-old Kazimierz Piotrowicz from Chrzanow presented over 115,000 signatures. The PKW rejected only 560. The plenipotentiary and chief of electoral staff for the candidate is his wife, Alicja. From day to day, the Piotrowicz family runs two firms. One of them produces therapeutic inserts for shoes. The future candidate for president is convinced of their beneficial action upon the organism. He claims that half of the signatures were gathered for him by friends among the thankful purchasers of the biothermal energy inserts.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Has your candidacy for the office of president got anything to do with the promotion of these inserts?

[Piotrowicz] No, there is nothing directly to do with the promotion of the inserts here, but, on the other hand, with the promotion of health for society, for Polish families. [end recording]

Today, a plenipotentiary presented the PKW with a list of signatures supporting a successive candidate. He is Professor Tadeusz Kozluk, the rector of a private higher school of business and administration.

Gronkiewicz-Waltz Interviewed on Presidential Race

WS2009135095 Poznan WPROST in Polish 17 Sep 95 pp 17-18

[Interview with Polish National Bank President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz by Krzysztof Golata and Jerzy Slawomir Mac; place and date not given: "The Antitype of a Feminist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [WPROST] In most countries, the central bank president does more than he says, particularly about political issues. His every word may result in either profits or losses to the state. You are not merely talking, but also vying for the office of Polish president.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It is quite natural that individuals performing public functions vie for state offices. The Finnish central bank chief ran in the presidential campaign, the German president was Constitutional Tribunal chairman earlier, and the Italian prime minister also came from the central bank. Since I took the office of central bank president, many people have been identifying me with the president, claiming that the Polish National Bank [NBP] is a fourth presidential department. Even if I had not participated in the election campaign, opinions that NBP's decisions serve Lech Walesa and his reelection would have appeared anyway.

[WPROST] Will the central bank chief's engagement in politics not weaken this institution's prestige among Western financial circles and its credibility among businessmen?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I do not think Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac's defeat in the latest election weakened the position of French capital. The presidential campaign and my possible defeat will not affect the central bank's operations. Two or three weeks after the election, nobody will remember the campaign, and everybody will focus his attention on the new president. His opponents will be quickly forgotten, which is natural.

[WPROST] In February 1995, you very rapidly reacted to an increase in inflation by raising interest rates. You have suggested reacting to the current decrease in inflation in the second half of September. Is this not "election sausage" for the private sector?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] If I lower interest rates, those who are saving money in banks complain. When I increase them, private businessmen demonstrate their discontent. The floating of the zloty's exchange rate brought about exporters' protests and positive reactions from importers. Everything that has taken place in the economy this year confirms that the decision I made in February was correct. I think it mobilized the Oleksy government to act more actively against inflation. I have never said, however, that we will reduce interest rates in mid-September. On 15 September, the bank's management board will assess the economic situation and will make a decision on interest rates.

[WPROST] You have described yourself as a supporter of social market economy. You are canvassing for trade union support, however. Will you be able to persuade the unionists about the need to close, for example, Ursus, several mines, and the Katowice steel mill, as well as to increase the required number of working hours for teachers?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We have agreed with Solidarity that reform of the social insurance system and mass enfranchisement of society are the two most important issues. We have not yet discussed other problems. We must do everything to arouse people's interest in privatization. During my meetings, people often ask me the following question: Why should we support privatization if we earn 5 million [currency not specified] in a state-run company and a "private businessmen" pays us as little as 3 million for the same work? Mass enfranchisement is essential.

[WPROST] Are you not scared by the fact that people connected with Ursus and Zygmunt Wrzodak, who approved of the program for mass privatization drafted by Feliks Siemienas, are becoming stronger and stronger within Solidarity?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] These are "boisterous" people without significant influence on the situation in the union.

[WPROST] However, they are very efficient and are backed by 15,000 Ursus employees.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] This means either as many as 15,000 or as few as 15,000 people. If I am to talk with Solidarity, I will do so with Krzaklewski, Janiak, Tomaszewski, and other members of the headquarters, but not with Wrzodak.

[WPROST] Asked why you are running in the election, you recently said the following: "I am running in the election to stop the threat coming from postcommunist forces and to unite the center right." Your candidacy, however, has resulted in further division and weakening of the center right-wing forces.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I disagree with this. I am backed by several groupings such as the Association of Catholic Families, the City and Village League (a large self-government organization comprising presidents and mayors of many cities), the St. Catherine Covenant, and the Christian National Union [ZChN].

[WPROST] You almost caused a split within the ZChN, and one of the party's leading activists, Jan Lopuszanski, said that you have no idea about politics.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I can only be happy that Jan Lopuszanski is not on my election team.

[WPROST] Who is on your election team? Although you are already second in preelectoral ratings, nothing is so far known about the number of signatures you have collected and people from your election team. Why is there this mysteriousness?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] This is my tactic. I will announce everything at the right time.

[WPROST] Professor Czaplinski, a well known social psychologist, says that he has not yet managed to intellectually ponder the phenomenon of your preelectoral success, which he has compared with the syndrome of [former presidential hopeful] Tyminski. You started without a political basis, and you come from an institution that does not arouse social confidence and is identified with international financial circles, even by the church.... Would you please help the professor in his intellectual struggle with your case?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am not a psychologist and do not analyze personalities. I am simply deeply convinced that I have a good chance of winning the election.

[WPROST] When did you become convinced of this? Was this caused by some political event or someone's suggestion?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Various individuals, both politicians and people not involved in politics, began to convince me of this as early as a year ago.

[WPROST] Of what did they convince you?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] They convinced me that I have the ability to unite people. Initially, I did not think about running in the election, but what finally convinced me was observation of other candidates. I think people are tired of politics and politicians, and they can witness increasingly gross scenes with the participation of these same politicians; they would like to trust a public person, though from outside any political arrangements.

[WPROST] As a public person, you have made a fortune on your education, professionalism, and refined social behavior—the attributes of the feminist movement. You sail, take good care of your appearance, and have your clothes made by the best dressmakers. At the same time, you verbally dissociate yourself from feminism and all female attributes that run counter to the archetype of the Polish mother.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I think I am warm and womanish, so I am the antitype of a feminist. At the same time, I do not want women who decided to stay home to look like gray mice. I think they no longer look like this. One can observe this in different places—for example, in churches, on the streets, or in parks. Women's self-esteem, however, should be increased.

[WPROST] What do you mean?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] This means that one should not consider a woman who is a scientist better than a woman raising children, despite the fact that the latter is also an educated professional.

[WPROST] Who is supposed to increase their self-esteem?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The media, for example, by writing about the family, and, first of all, the state by creating a tax system favoring families, issuing education bonds, and using similar solutions.

[WPROST] What can the president do in this area within his powers?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] As a matter of fact, his powers are insignificant, but I am surprised that President Walesa, who has eight children, has not established the office of representative for family matters.

[WPROST] What would be your first decision as Polish president?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I would set up a decent Presidential Chancellery.

[WPROST] Would you dissolve parliament?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I would examine the situation. If polls indicating that the Left Democratic Alliance can independently form a government were confirmed, I would not dissolve it. I would not. If there is a deeper split within the current coalition, however, the Sejm's self-dissolution would not be ruled out. The situation we had in 1989 may thus recur, and the left would again voluntarily give up power for a certain period of time to make it possible for someone else to achieve what it has been unable to do—for example, to reform the social protection system.

[WPROST] Have you purposely not mentioned our admission to European structures so far? Right-wing politicians are laying down more and more conditions for them, apparently forgetting that we are the ones who are knocking at their doors.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am trying to convince right-wing politicians that it is possible to preserve our identity within the EU. As an example, I give Greece, which is a religious state, according to its Constitution, while Poland is not such a state. For security reasons, however, our admission to NATO is more important. We cannot join the EU with inflation exceeding 30 percent, so we must first complete economic reforms.

[WPROST] Do several Bundeswehr companies deployed on our border represent a better guarantee than several billion dollars invested by the West within our borders? After all, the case of Kuwait can teach us something....

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We are neither Yugoslavia nor Kuwait. The situation on our eastern border is alarming, and security is the most important issue. In this regard, I think there is full agreement among all post-Solidarity forces.

People Behind Presidential Candidates Viewed

WS2009130195 Poznan WPROST in Polish
17 Sep 95 pp 22-23

[Article by Eryk Mistewicz and Roman Strzemniecki: "Who Organizes the Election Campaign? The War of Campaign Staffs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The chief of Adam Strzembosz's campaign team is the deputy director of the personnel office of Polish Television; he is now on leave. Jacek Kuron is surrounded by young people and Aleksander Kwasniewski by "shrewd politicians." The person responsible for raising funds for the campaign of Tadeusz Zielinski is the head of the Wroclaw office of the PKO BP bank. Candidates for the highest state office are using the services of self-governmental activists, men of ideas, and professional politicians. One team is headed by a private detective.*

"Work on a campaign staff offers the opportunity of creative expression to artists, managers, and athletes," says Professor Jerzy Bralczyk of Warsaw University.

The first campaign team to be set up was the campaign staff of Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski. It is headed by Sejm Deputy Danuta Waniek, former deputy minister of national defense. Responsibility for contacts with the press has been assumed by Deputy Zbigniew Siemiatkowski and Alfa Hermanska. Kwasniewski's safety is guaranteed by Jerzy Dziewulski, SLD deputy and former head of the antiterrorist unit at Okecie airport. Even though it is primarily the task of activists of local structures of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic to protect election meetings, Dziewulski has already had several occasions to take advantage of his skills in ensuring peace at meetings.

Maciej Poreba coordinates those meetings, and Edward Kuczera is responsible for financial issues. "The fact that the election date is later than we expected has caused temporary, I hope, problems in financial liquidity," concedes Kuczera, adding that a list of sponsors is in the making.

"Let us pay attention to who is behind the candidates," sociologists keep saying. "Mr. Ireneusz Sekula is not working on Mr. Kwasniewski's staff," young social democrats emphasize.

The campaign staff of the central bank president, which is still in the making, will most probably include her professional advisers—Professor Adam Kaminski, of the Political Studies Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences [PAN], and Doctor Jan Macieja (also a member of PAN). The former is to deal with foreign policy, whereas the latter will deal with economic issues. Another person who will cooperate with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz during the election campaign will be Professor Michal Kulesza, former plenipotentiary of the government for reforming territorial self-governments. This may be a sign of the increasing importance the bank president is attaching to self-governmental issues in her campaign. In press interviews, she speaks favorably about the National League, a self-governmental rightist movement established in 1994. Now that the Christian-National Union [ZChN] has endorsed her candidacy and the party's activists have set up the Committee of Social Support, members of the ZChN leadership do not conceal the fact that they are hoping for promotions—in the campaign staff, to begin with.

"The title of an adviser, expert, or chief adviser to a candidate who is becoming increasingly popular sounds good. There is nothing wicked in this mechanism of the 'political kitchen,'" political scientists say. "The chief of staff, the right-hand man of a given candidate, is supposed to help him out on issues about which the candidate does not know much."

The campaign team of Jacek Kuron is headed by Michal Boni, labor minister in the Bielecki government and, unlike the impulsive Kuron, a very good organizer.

Young trade unionist Rafal Szymczak is responsible for contacts with the press. He does not want to say who is responsible for financing the campaign because, as he says with a mysterious expression on his face, "he is not authorized to do that."

Aside from Kuron's campaign staff, there are also the so-called supporting committees, headed by Professor Karol Modzelewski, former honorary chairman of the Labor Union [UP]. In the campaign there is also room for "political veterans." The person responsible for contacts with the supporting committees is Jozef Chajn, who was an activist of the democratic opposition from the 1960's. The committees are made up of 200 authors of "The Letter of Support," who helped draw up the report on the condition of the state. While this report was being prepared, the persons who coordinated all the work were Henryka Bochniarz, minister of industry in the Bielecki cabinet, and Sociology Professor Jerzy Szadzki.

Lech Walesa does not need any supporting committees. As recently as a year ago, Andrzej Zakrzewski, who holds the office of a minister of state today and heads the section of the president's political services, sent a letter to members of the president's councils and appealed to them to jointly find an answer to the following question: "What should 21st century Poland be like?" For a few months now, he has been trying to persuade more and more people to join the group of intellectuals who support Lech Walesa's reelection efforts. "Unfortunately, the boss believes that a formal committee would make him lose the initiative. It is difficult to convince him that this is not the case," says one of his closest aides. Moreover, unlike in the case of other candidates, the campaign staff of the incumbent president will have exclusively executive functions; creativity will be left to Lech Walesa.

The team is headed by Jerzy Gwizdz, chairman of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, and the person in charge of the "fund-raising" policies is most probably presidential Economic Secretary Andrzej Kozakiewicz, who works in the deserted Belweder.

"I do not need the so-called authorities," says Stanislaw Tyminski, Walesa's countercandidate in the previous presidential election, adding: "Numerous authorities did not provide much help to Mazowiecki. It is the teams that do all of the work." A member of the election staff of the X Party's candidate is again Jozef Kostecki, the author of reports "that reveal how international financial circles are looting Poland." "There is no problem as far as money is concerned. However, today GAZETA WYBORCZA will demand several times as much as it did five years ago, when it got $5,000 for my ad," says Tyminski.

Professor Tadeusz Zielinski's campaign staff is headed by Jerzy Rogala-Lewicki, head of the office of the UP National Council, even though the formal head of the committee is Andrzej Micewski, a Sejm deputy who ran on the ticket of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] but who is now independent. Support from regional UP structures (20 regional committees) has already enabled Zielinski to collect the required number of signatures. UP Deputy Wojciech Lamentowicz is the spokesman of Zielinski's staff. Funds for the campaign are being raised by Krystyna Nowicka, director of the Wroclaw office of the PKO BP bank.

"It sometimes happens that well-known and respected people endorse one candidate but then change their minds. This does not have to be reprehensible: They may not see any possibility of using their abilities at the side of one candidate, so they try to find another," says Prof. Bralczyk.

The person who is heading the campaign staff of Adam Strzembosz, who frequently appears in the media despite a poor rating in opinion polls, is Adam Cichocki. Cichocki is the deputy director of the Personnel Office of Polish Television SA, now on leave. Miroslaw Styczen is responsible for the coordination of raising funds from private donations. Also, a Social Committee in Support of Adam Strzembosz has been set up, which, according to its advocates, comprises "150 regional offices that are changing into regional campaign staffs." The primary task was to obtain the support of "luminaries and authorities" for the candidacy of Adam Strzembosz—the support of such people as Professor Zygmunt Kolenda of the Academy of Mining and Metallurgy; journalists Maciej Letowski and Maciej Ilowiecki; Stanislaw Remuszko, an expert on public opinion research; Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski; and Professor Anna Grabowska of the Family Section of the Warsaw Catholic Intellectuals Club, who specializes in spectroscopy and photochemistry.

The campaign staff of Jan Olszewski, honorary chairman of the Movement for the Republic, assumed its final shape after quite a long time. The head of the National Campaign Staff is today Zbigniew Wojciechowski, and the person in charge of Jan Olszewski's National Campaign Committee, which is supposed to attract people of considerable prestige, is Professor Jacek Trznadel, a critic and poet.

A campaign team for PSL candidate Waldemar Pawlak has not yet been formally set up. After his narrow victory during the party's convention, Pawlak will most probably have to settle for Michal Strak, Leslaw Podkanski, and Kazimierz Oleksiak in his campaign.

"Our candidate does not want to surround himself with well-known names; however, there are the so-called authorities around us. Yet I will not reveal any names," said Jolanta Kraczynska, head of Janusz Korwin-Mikke's campaign staff, mysteriously. The person responsible for contacts with business circles is Zbigniew Sarata. Members of the staff are young enthusiasts.

Candidates of "the third league" often set up their campaign staffs with the help of their relatives. "I am pretty strict, so young people are afraid to work with me. I do not have much money, and I do not know what will happen next," says Mieczyslaw Szylka, a candidate for the highest state office. Leszek Bubel, of the Polish Party of Beer Lovers, has decided to put his faith in the hands of a professional. Due to the fact that the only reason his name appeared in the election campaign was that he was beaten up by female employees of a disorderly house, the head of his campaign staff is Krzysztof Maciag, a private detective.

Bartoszewski on Timetable for EU, NATO Entry

*BR2009125995 Paris LE FIGARO in French
20 Sep 95 p 3*

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski by Pierre Bocev in Brussels; date not given: "Bartoszewski: 'Year 2000 Realistic for Polish Membership of EU'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bocev] Sir Leon Brittan says that you will have to see out a long transition period in relations with the EU.

[Bartoszewski] Poland is not opposed to that. We would not agree to a very long transition period, but a lengthy transition period will be necessary. Psychologically it is essential. Our people already have the feeling that it has endured enough in the perspective of joining the EU, and we must not disappoint it.

[Bocev] Do you think the year 2000 is a reasonable date?

[Bartoszewski] We have all heard the encouraging words of Chancellor Kohl. Of course, there are still dozens of problems to overcome, but we are working on them and the year 2000 is a reasonable date.

[Bocev] And what about NATO membership?

[Bartoszewski] Entering the EU is a political decision, but, above all, it is an economic decision. Membership in NATO is purely political.

We would have made more progress if Mr. Yeltsin had not said what he did (and in contradiction to his previous statements) and if certain politicians were not quite so impressionable. However, I think 1998 is a reasonable hypothesis.

[Bocev] To take Russian objections into account, the Atlantic alliance is preparing the entry conditions for the East European countries whereby they would not be allowed to have foreign troops or nuclear weapons on their soil. How do you react to that?

[Bartoszewski] Poland agrees with any collective solution and has no preconditions for membership.

Nobody in today's world would dream of having certain weapons on their territory. However, military technology is such that 200 km either way does not make much difference these days. While one day there may be some kind of psychological problem about knowing whether atomic weapons should be deployed beyond the Bug or Oder Rivers, we will attach no importance to that.

[Bocev] What do you intend to say or do in response to Moscow's arguments?

[Bartoszewski] We have shared borders with Ukraine and Belarus, both of which claim to be independent, and with Lithuania, which also wants to join NATO, plus 200 km of border with Russia running through the middle of a forest in the region of Kaliningrad. Does that really give the Kremlin a right of veto? We will not let ourselves be limited in our choice by squealing from Moscow.

Okonski Stresses Importance of NATO Expansion

LD2109124395 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1131 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Sep (PAP)—Asked to comment on the document adopted yesterday by the NATO Council of Ambassadors entitled "Why and How Should NATO Expand?," Defense Minister Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski stressed today that "the decision itself on the expansion of NATO is very important."

Criteria for admission, however, are going to be "a subject for further analysis and discussion," the minister said. According to Okonski, a proper decision will be made in December at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the "16."

The minister is not disappointed with the content of the document although, as he said, he knew it only from press reports because he had not expected it to include any specific dates or the order in which new members would be admitted.

PNTCD Politician Criticizes Government

AU2009115895 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 15 Sep 95 p 4

[Interview with Ion Diaconescu, first vice president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD), by Andrei Costa; place and date not given: "The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty Between Desire and Uncertainty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Costa] Why is no headway currently being made in the negotiations on the conclusion of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty?

[Diaconescu] Even the latest negotiations in Bucharest between Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs and the Romanian authorities (19-20 July 1995—editorial note) did not result in an official joint communique, which would have made us draw an optimistic conclusion, or any conclusion at all. It seems that the latest round was not a dialogue, but rather a series of monologues. No progress has been made compared with the preceding situation. It seems that the sides have no interest in finally finding a solution to the problem. This is what the public at large is bound to think after seeing all kinds of artificial obstacles being constantly raised to the process of reaching an understanding on this matter. At one point, there was only that controversial Recommendation 1201 [of the Council of Europe on minority rights]. But now I see that Recommendation 1201 has slipped back to a secondary role, with the Education Law moving into first place. If this dispute is also solved, then we will probably see another problem appearing on the horizon. In other words, it seems that we are far from a solution to the problem, because this state of tension and lack of understanding apparently serve certain political interests. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and the extremist Hungarian parties in Hungary may be feeding their propaganda from this policy of excessive claims. Equally in Romania, there is this attitude that fuels extremist trends, including parties that proclaim themselves as the defenders of the country's integrity, the rights of Romanians, and so forth. Therefore, this conflict of interests between Romania and Hungary provides support for a lot of forces in their political struggle. This may be an important reason why no headway has been made and the situation remains at a standstill, with the negotiations not progressing even one centimeter toward an understanding at the latest session.

[Costa] What solutions do you envisage for deblocking the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations?

[Diaconescu] As far as our country is concerned, I believe that the government can only fight this excessive Hungarian claim by improving Romania's image. But then a country's image is provided by its government. Unfortunately, our country's current image is negative, because of the policy conducted by the Vacaroiu regime and its extremist allies. The UDMR and Hungary are profiting from that.

[Costa] For example?

[Diaconescu] Let us take the case of the European Parliament's resolution on the Education Law in our country. None of the foreign members of parliament who voted for that resolution had any idea about the content of the Education Law or our history and Transylvania's history. It was enough for Otto von Habsburg, who is a prominent figure with multiple connections on the international plane, to raise this problem in support of Hungary for the other foreign members of parliament automatically to rally to vote against Romania. Therefore, the votes were not cast as a function of the contents of the law, but rather as a function of personal empathies, general opinions, and the credibility enjoyed by a given country. Unfortunately, Romania does not yet enjoy such a credibility.

[Costa] What can be done about this?

[Diaconescu] Romania's current position on this issue is quite reasonable, because nobody intends to deprive the Hungarian population of its legitimate rights; besides, we no longer live in a time when you can deprive people of their nationality. Therefore, Romania's position is correct. Nevertheless, we must win over the "European jury" and also acquire "European attorneys" to defend our just positions. Anyhow, the main thing that we must do now is, I repeat, to improve Romania's image abroad.

[Costa] How could this be done?

[Diaconescu] Only a change of regime and government could lead to an improvement in our image.

[Costa] Still, how could we improve the country's image in the world before the next general elections in Romania?

[Diaconescu] There are a few small steps that could still be made. Many people suggest that the current ruling party should detach itself from its allies, because these parties have a bad reputation internationally. However, if the government renounces these allies, then the it would become a minority one, which in turn would create other problems. Occasionally, on major issues, the opposition parties might agree to vote with the government on certain laws, if they are right. However, all governments seek sure alliances on which they can rely in both good times and bad. Besides, I do not see a party that truly considers itself to belong to the opposition automatically giving the current government a blank cheque of trust. Hence the difficulty faced by the current ruling party, which cooperates with these parties out of a need for a parliamentary majority, since the allied parties have always voted for the Vacaroiu government. For our international image, this situation causes great headaches. Therefore, the Vacaroiu government will have to weigh up this situation and eventually part with its extremist allies.

[Costa] Suppose that the current ruling party rid itself of all its extremist allies, would then the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] accept a possible alliance with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]?

[Diaconescu] An alliance between ourselves and the current ruling party is not possible. Some time ago, when this problem was discussed, our view was that we would not accept government cooperation unless we had a say in the new government policy and were able to make our own policy. Hence, that government should have emerged from another parliamentary majority, in which no party held a monopoly of power.

Now, with just a short time left until the next general elections, there is no point in upsetting the apple cart. Consequently, we do not wish to enter into any kind of government coalition with the current ruling party.

Ethnic Implications of Romanian Education Law

AU2009072795 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 16 Sep 95 p 99

[Article by Janos Irhazi: "In Hungarian in Minority—Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the education law passed in Romania this July, Romanian has to be taught at all school levels, in other words, Romanian classes have to be set up in all places if they do not already exist. The law guarantees the right to learn and teach in Hungarian and other national minority languages—the national minorities can be proportionately represented in the leadership where national minority education exists—but the learning and mastering of Romanian as official language is compulsory for everyone (it is only possible to apply for places in military type schools and to teach in these in Romanian). In addition to this, files and documents can only be made out in Romanian language in the state and private educational establishments.

As to the national minorities, the law prescribes that, depending on local needs, national minority language groups, classes, or sections can be set up on request, but only if "this does not hamper the teaching and learning of the Romanian language." (According to official Romanian statistics in 1994, some 125,480 school children attended year levels one to eight, 30,475 students attended year levels nine to 12, and 593 students studied as apprentices in Hungarian language eudcational establishments, and they were taught by 8,670 Hungarian teachers.) A separate school book is being made for the elementary teaching of the Romanian language and literature for the national minorities, but the school books have to be identical to the ones used in Romanian schools from the fifth year. After the elementary levels, Romania's geography and history have to be taught in Romanian and exams in these subjects can only be taken in Romanian.

According to the law, the history and traditions of the national minorities have to be "reflected" in the upper elementary school books World History and Romania's History and in the educational programs, and learning the mother tongue and literature has to be "ensured" for national minority students attending Romanian schools. In high schools [ages 14 to 18], the national minority members, upon special request, can learn about their own history and traditions in their mother tongue, and the curriculum and school books necessary for these have to be approved by the Education Ministry.

Specialist subjects have to be taught in Romanian, but mastering the terminology in the mother tongue also "has to be ensured, depending on the possibilities." At the state-run medical universities, it is possible to teach in the national minority tongue but the Romanian terminology also has to be learned at the same time. According to this, it is possible to teach in Hungarian at the Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] Medical University. National minority groups or sections can also be set up in other establishments of higher education, but only to train the teachers, cultural workers, and artists necessary for them. This means that an independent Hungarian university cannot be set up but the Istvan Szentgyorgyi drama college in Marosvasarhely can continue to operate.

According to the law, entrance exams and exams in general have to be taken in Romanian at all school levels, except for schools where national minority education still exists. In August, Education Minister Liviu Maior authorized that entrance examinations to Romanian schools can also be taken in national minority languages, including Hungarian.

The Education Ministry has to ensure the books and teachers necessary for education. Although it might be true that Hungarian history, for example, can be taught, no authorized curriculum or books exist for this or any other subject, therefore, their education in schools is—legally—unresolved.

UDMR: Ruling Party's Intent 'Unfriendly'

AU2009174195 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] has assessed the recent meeting of the leaders of parliamentary political formations held at Cotroceni Palace as important and the proposal advanced by Romania's president for Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation as extremely interesting, said UDMR President Bela Marko, at the news conference that UDMR held today.

However, Bela Marko said he believes that, although various proposals had been advanced and negotiations were held, this process has not started yet, the issue of minorities requiring a judicial solution and not only a statement of intent.

Further, responding to accusations voiced by some leaders of the opposition and mainly by those of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party regarding the radicalization of the UDMR position, Bela Marko said that in fact, this means a change in the place and position of these parties on the issue of minorities, for tactical reasons of electoral strategy.

In conclusion to the news conference, the representatives of the UDMR assessed the intention of the ruling party [Social Democracy Party of Romania] to give up the post of Mures County Mayor in favor of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] as an unfriendly gesture, that runs counter to the reconciliation proposals advanced by Romania's president, our correspondent Victor Caraculacu informed us.

Businessman Sees Economic Increase in 4-5 Years

AU2009070095 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 13 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Dina Radulescu: "Do We Need a Century To Catch Up With Developed Countries?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It is true that the Romanian industry is very developed from a quantitative point of view (in each town there are at least three industrial units), but it is also true that it is at least 20-25 years behind developed countries from a technical and conceptual viewpoint" said Fedele Battisti, vice president of the Italia-Romania Friendship Association, during his recent visit to our country. "It is behind even by 100 years as regards the construction system, because the construction in Italy is 50 percent cheaper. Likewise, the serious deficiency in infrastructure and the strange evaluation system can astonish even the most serious foreign business partner. However, every time one takes into account the fact that Romania's market—more than all the other markets of the countries neighboring it—is an empty, unoccupied market. Hence, it is very tempting for businessmen. Thus, after the big jump—technological renewal—in about four to five years, Romania could start recording an economic increase," said Mr. Battisti. Asked what is the basis for his statement, he said: "First of all the Latin character that is common to both peoples." It is very true, we might say. The only thing is that in Italy, economy influences politics, and when economy is doing poorly—the government falls. In our case....

Perry Cited on Lifting Embargo, Military Cooperation

AU2009210195 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 18 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Marko Milosavljevic: "End of Embargo for Slovenia After the War in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 17 September—U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry ended a two-day official visit to Slovenia yesterday. In a statement made in Bled prior to his departure, he emphasized once again the importance of central Europe for security in Europe. At the Saturday news conference with Defense Minister Kacin he also outlined concrete U.S. measures for Slovenia's integration into the European security structures. U.S.-Slovene military cooperation will be intensified, too, and joint maneuvers organized—our country will receive $1 million aid for this purpose. A resident U.S. attache with his staff, who will take care of the cooperation with the Slovene Army, will also arrive in Slovenia.

Minister Kacin announced that the Americans would attend the Potres [earthquake] drill next year, whose purpose would be to train for rescues in natural and other disasters. The U.S. Army is supposed to participate with a field hospital and will also take care of the logistics. Perry said he supported the Slovene request for the lifting of the arms embargo as this entailed "legitimate defense requirements." This will only be possible at the end of the war in the Balkans. However, Perry is "cautiously optimistic" and hopes that a peace agreement on Bosnia will be signed by the end of the year.

Minister Kacin thanked the U.S. Administration for its interpretation of the arms embargo, which allowed Slovenia to purchase helicopters for its military and civilian requirements as well as the second wide-range radar, which will provide greater security for air traffic.

Kacin also pointed out that Slovene officers were already training in the United States, namely, one at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs and the other at the U.S. Military Academy. With U.S. assistance, our army hopes to achieve NATO standards and the officers have to be appropriately trained for this task. Education for this purpose will be organized in Slovenia, followed by courses and programs abroad. A resident U.S. military attache and additional staff will arrive to Ljubljana soon. While the attache will be situated in the U.S. Embassy, the staff will be in contact with our army throughout Slovenia, the prime minister's office announced.

Perry said that the professionalism of the Slovene officers who took part in joint maneuvers with the U.S. Army in Louisiana a few months ago, made a lasting impression on him. In a joint statement which he issued together with Prime Minister Drnovsek in Bled on Sunday he said that out of all central and east European countries Slovenia "made the biggest step forward in the transition in all key spheres: democracy, market economy, and establishment of the civilian supervision over the military structures." "No country has been as effective as Slovenia," he said.

At the Saturday news conference Perry, of course, could not avoid questions concerning the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said that the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo, which for the time being only allows free movement to the members of the UN Protection Force, would be followed by another two steps: Cease-fire in a wider area and free transport. When asked when could Croatia hope to become a member of the Partnership for Peace like other central European countries, Perry replied that everything would be possible once a peace agreement on Bosnia has been reached and the embargo lifted. "Countries like Croatia will also be able to join the Partnership for Peace then." Perry, who was one of the staunchest champions of the development of the so-called stealth technology, which allows aircraft to become invisible for radar, also said that Italy did not allow the landing of these F-117 aircraft because they probably would not be needed in Bosnia any longer. According to the latest reports by General Janvier, the Serbs have nevertheless accelerated their withdrawal of heavy arms yesterday and Perry, therefore, hopes that NATO aircraft will not need to attack again. The U.S. defense secretary will continue his central European tour in Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Drnovsek, Croatian Prime Minister on Border Issues

LD2009151095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We are only one step away from a final solution of all problems between Croatia and Slovenia, according to the Croatian and Slovene prime ministers, Nikica Valentic and Janez Drnovsek respectively, after a three-hour meeting in Maribor. Also part of the government delegations were the Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler and Hrvoje Kacic and Istok Simoneti, chairmen of the mixed commissions for border issues. Here is a report from Maribor by Vera Tomasek:

Both premiers expressed satisfaction with the latest meeting—the seventh this year. The solutions to the problems under discussion are by no means simple, Valentic told journalists:

[Begin Valentic recording] The solution of the Piran Gulf issue is the starting point and prerequisite for the solution of virtually all outstanding problems. Our commissions of experts have more or less reached an agreement, I would go so far as to say, on all outstanding border issues—there are perhaps merely nuances outstanding—however, the question of the Piran Gulf is objectively a serious issue, a major problem. [end recording]

With regard to the Gulf of Piran, Slovenia today put forward fresh proposals which the Croatian Government will examine for the next few days. Journalists asked what was the substance of these proposals.

[Begin Valentic recording] It is a question of very sensitive political, technical, and legal nuances. In fact any wrong interpretation could hinder rather than help us. We sincerely wish to resolve this problem and we would indeed not meet so frequently with this lineup if we did not have the most sincere intention of resolving this very serious and complex problem. If we resolved this problem and if the global relations between Slovenia and Croatia were resolved, this would be a record for all problems to be resolved in the four years since separation and this is our goal. This would help our states and quite frankly our governments too, because it is in the interests of the government and the role of the government to assist in the rapprochement and development of relations with neighboring friendly countries. We will, therefore, precisely because of the importance of this, examine this proposal very seriously within the deadline and give an answer, which of course I cannot prejudice in advance. [end recording]

Slovene Prime Minister Drnovsek told journalists that a final solution to the problems was very close, from the problem of the Gulf of Piran to the problem of Ljubljana banka savings, the Krsko nuclear power plant and ownership and legal relations. Both sides believe that an agreement between Croatia and Slovenia is an important factor for the stability of the region.

Granic and Taler informed journalists that a general consulate of Croatia would be opened in Maribor at the beginning of next year.

Federal

Lilic Thanks Red Cross for Helping Refugees

LD2009163895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1316 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 20 (TANJUG)—The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) thanked here Wednesday the President of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Marija Villarroel Lander for his help in accomodating refugees from the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK).

Lilic stressed that 250,000 Serbs fled RSK after the latest Croatian aggression and that the number of Serb refugees from central and western Bosnia after the current Muslim-Croat offenisve and NATO air strikes had risen to 180,000, the office of the FRY president said.

Humanitarian problems could be so [word indistinct] and the suffering of civilians stopped only by the conclusion of peace, President Lilic stressed.

Pointing out that the FRY was committed to peace and urging the immediate cessation of hostilities, Lilic warned that 'Europe will not be able to stop this great tragedy if it does not show enough wisdom and foresight'.

Lander praised the Yugoslav Government and especially the Yugoslav Red Cross for doing its part thoroughly.

'The recently signed agreement between our federation and the FRY Government will help speed up and expand the existing humanitarian actions', he stressed.

President Lilic said that the international federation can count on the full cooperation of the Yugoslav Government, of state bodies and of humanitarian organizations, in the first place the Yugoslav Red Cross, whose personnel has proved by its deeds it is helping all people who are in need of it, regardless of their religion or nationality.

Milutinovic Views Bosnian Peace Process

BR2009114795 Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Sep 95 p 4

[Interview with Serbian Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic by Jean-Claude Galli in Belgrade; date not given: "Milutinovic: 'The Key is Belgrade-Zagreb Relations'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Galli] Do you envisage willingly recognizing Bosnia and Croatia?

[Milutinovic] We would not do it willingly, but we understand the difference between what we want and the reality of the situation. The reality is an international community that does not have any clear logic to its ideas. For example, consider the words of my colleague Herve de Charette in an interview he gave the NASA BORBA newspaper. He said that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a unified state that would once again bring our peoples together—but that was the kind of Bosnia we had before the war!

[Galli] Why do you wish to come to Paris?

[Milutinovic] I myself am wondering that, I really am... We are always accused of being the aggressors, NATO is attacking Serbian positions and not the Muslim or Croatian positions, and nobody says a word about the Serbian exodus with convoys of civilian refugees that are being fired upon—so yes, I do wonder why I am here! However, I cannot believe that the French position is definitive.

[Galli] What guarantees did the Americans give you in Geneva for you to recognize Bosnia and Croatia in return for recognition of a Srpska Republic for the Bosnian Serbs?

[Milutinovic] None. A principle agreement was made on settling the Bosnian problem constitutionally, but that is all. The basic principle is that both sides should have the same rights. Now we have to transpose the Geneva agreement onto the maps, and, believe me, all parties will have to make many sacrifices.

[Galli] What guarantees are you prepared to give?

[Milutinovic] Our desire to obtain peace must not be understood as being a sign of weakness. We have our limits... The Serbs have always shown great restraint in military operations, not just around Sarajevo but generally in the former Yugoslavia for the past four years. If the Serbs had used all the means at their disposal then there would not be any negotiation problems today because there would be no Bosnia!

[Galli] Does the loss of Banja Luka, for example, fall within your limits?

[Milutinovic] Banja Luka has not yet fallen and I do not think it will. The front line has now fully stabilized.

[Galli] Would a Croatian attack in eastern Slavonia be considered as an act of war?

[Milutinovic] Yes. You cannot resolve the problem in this region by force.

[Galli] Have you warned Zagreb and the international community about this?

[Milutinovic] Yes, but the key to the solution is good relations between Serbia and Croatia. We have to settle the Eastern Slavonia dispute between us and not link it to the Bosnian problem. Our common interest is to settle the Bosnian conflict first. Once peace has been restored to this country we can then turn our attention to the economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia.

French Diplomat Voices Support for Belgrade

LD2009113895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1045 GMT 20 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 20 (TANJUG)—French Charge D'affaires in Belgrade Gabriel Keller has stated that it is high time that top French officials recognised Yugoslavia's strong support for peace efforts on the former Yugoslavia.

In an interview published Wednesday by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES, Keller said France would remain Serbia's friend and intended to restore ties that used to link their two peoples.

Keller, who is directly involved in preparations for Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic's visit to France, said this was by no means a courtesy visit, saying the visit would focus on peace talks and bilateral relations.

He said first of all, tempers should cool over all that had happened and now belonged to past.

There is no reason why France and Serbia should not be friends and Milutinovic's visit should therefore open a new stage in the two countries' relations, he added.

Keller said France had told Croats that it would back their membership in the European Union, and said France would tell the same now to the Serbs, too.

Serbia is preoccupied with its history, he said. It should overcome the mood and bravely start anew, he added.

Keller said Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was the only official on the Yugoslav side who had credibility with international circles.

'For that reason, we want to back strongly his political position in this much too sensitive process. In that context, the moment the Yugoslav Government recognises Bosnia, the majority of the sanctions (against Yugoslavia) will be lifted,' he said.

Keller said a large delegation of French businessmen would pay a visit to Belgrade next month to discuss possible deals once the sanctions were lifted.

In this connection he said today's economic space in the Balkans must play an important role in Europe in the future and that a transforamation to this end must begin immediately. He added that there was no reason whatsoever why Europe should end in Austria.

Krajina Serb: Croatia Hunting War Criminals

LD1909121695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1125 GMT 19 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 19 (TANJUG)—Milovan Lezaja, 40, a Serb from the Republic of Serb Krajina saved his life in the Croatian aggression by taking refuge in U.N. peacekeepers' bases. Lezaja, who was a teacher in Gornji Karin in serb Krajina, is now a refugee in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Lezaja told TANJUG that the Croatian Army was hunting for alleged war criminals among the few Serbs who remained in Krajina.

Out of the 795 Serbs who took refuge from the Croatian aggression in the U.N. base in Knin, Croatia has kept about 40 accusing them of war crimes, Lezaja said.

The rest of them arrived in Yugoslavia on Saturday evening and were taken over by the Yugoslav Red Cross and Serbia's high commissioner for refugees.

According to Lezaja, who first took shelter on August 6 in the U.N. base near Benkovac and later spent one month in the Knin base, Croatian authorities strived to force the U.N. to hand over as many Serbs as possible claiming that they were war criminals.

'The Croatians exerted all kinds of pressure. They came several times for talks and tried to persuade the U.N. that there were many war criminals but the Canadians firmly denied their requests. All trace of many people would have been lost if the Canadians had not been there,' Lezaja said.

Lezaja said that Serb refugees organized their own guard in the U.N. base in Knin (where Jordanian peacekeepers were stationed). Younger men put up a barbed-wire fence and sat isolated from intruders, he said.

During the talks in the Knin base, Croatian authorities claimed that there were 68 war criminals among the Serbs. The Kenyan batallion pledged not to hand them over but later on yielded and turned over 40 people before the departure of the refugee convoy to Yugoslavia.

'There are no grounds for accusing any of them of war crimes. among those handed over to Croatians were Bozo Cosic, an economist, and Marko Strbac, a peasant, whom I personally knew. Strbac was a very good man who only helped people,' Lezaja said.

In villages in the Knin municipality, Croatian soldiers collected children and old people who were unable to leave their homes or did not wish to. Croatians took them to a camp in the town of Zadar where there were already 250 people, including children and babies.

Among them were Milena Obradovic from the village of Dabasnica (municipality of Lapac) with six children: Slobodan, 14, Miodrag, 12, Snezana, 10, savka, 7, milan, 6, and the youngest Goran only a year and a half.

Central Bank Governor Calls For Privatization

LD2009112795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1031 GMT 20 Sep 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Milocer, Yugoslavia, Sept. 20 (TANJUG)—Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (Central Bank) Dragoslav Avramovic has said that a prompt privatization in Yugoslavia would have a positive effect on prices.

Speaking at a Serbian economists' conference in Montenegro's Adriatic resort of Milocer, Avramovic said that the current monthly 6-7 percent price rise in industrial products was the result of the monopolistic structure of the economy and lack of private competition on the domestic market.

Avramovic said the situation in the Yugoslav economy was not very promising, but singled out as positive the fact that prices on produce markets had been stable for over a year.

He said the negative trade balance in August had improved and that foreign currency reserves were rising slowly.

Avramovic said the foreign currency exchange rate on the black market had been stagnating for three months now, but the parallel economy was still operating despite all the efforts to eliminate it.

Avramovic is the architect of the Yugoslav economic recovery program launched in January 1994 which slashed hyperinflation to zero and pegged the national currency—the dinar—to the German mark at a one-for-one parity on the basis of a foreign currency backing.

Avramovic proposeed new economic measures to restore the dinar's convertibility. He called for a stable currency and restoration of convertibility, saying that numerous administrative restrictions of exports and imports should be abolished in order to boost Yugoslav exporters' competitiveness and competition on the home market to crush the current monopolies.

Avramovic said the further stability of the dinar must be secured, seeing this as a mainstay of stable prices.

Serbia

Milosevic, Stoltenberg Discuss Bosnia Situation

LD2009161195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1529 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Sep (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, today received Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the international conference on former Yugoslavia.

They mainly discussed ways to ease the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and expressed the categorical joint standpoint that all armed conflicts in the region should cease immediately.

They also pointed to the need to fully coordinate and link all current diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a dynamic and ultimately successful peace process.

Commentary Criticizes Russian Stance on Bosnia

AU2009183095 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Djuro Bilbija: "Yeltsin Against Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian intelligence service knew a full seven days before the latest monstrous manipulation in Sarajevo that the Western Muslims were preparing the second attack on the Markale market, but the Kremlin did nothing to either protect the "Bosnian Serbs" and the peace process or to organize at least a competent and honest investigation. It missed the opportunity, which can also hardly be a coincidence, to check on the doubts expressed publicly by A. Demurenko, the Russian head of the Sarajevo UN Protection Force Headquarters.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin threatened the West six days ago with a reexamination of Russian relations with NATO if the "unacceptable bombing" of the "Serb Republic" territory did not stop immediately. Nothing happened, however....

The troops of the Western alliance are still bombing Serbian positions and civilians, as well as Russian international prestige and its national interests. So far, there has been no serious examinination of the relations between Russia and the West. The minimum that Moscow could have achieved relatively easily was not achieved: It could have revoked its consent for UN Security Council Resolution 836, which regulates the relations in the triangle formed by the United Nations, NATO, and the UN Protection Force. This resolution made it possible for NATO to become superior to the United Nations and to test the models for a large-scale, final destabilization of what has remained of the former imperial and "red empire." What is more, Warren Christopher and Willy Claes openly told Yeltsin that his threats were not at all important—that they could stop neither the air strikes against "the historic Russian ally" nor the eastward expansion of NATO, to the geopolitical space that Russia considered to be within the sphere of its strategic interests until yesterday.

Sterile Threats

So far, official Moscow has now only dared to reach for something that has regularly (in the case of the former Yugoslavia) proven to be futile—to require that an "urgent" UN Security Council session be held, at which Russia would be deprived of the use of its right of veto in advance and the West (perhaps) would make concessions to the Kremlin diplomacy only as far as this suited its interests and as far as this was necessary for the maintenance of the internal stability of Yeltsin's regime, the existence of which is one of the priorities in the policy of most of the leading Western countries, which is—again—not a coincidence. That the Russian political, military, and diplomatic leadership is ready to endure the humiliation and to make concessions can be seen by Yeltsin's defense minister, General Pavel Grachov, only repeating the sterile threats of his president the day before yesterday: That the Kremlin might reexamine its relations with the West if the air strikes against the Serbs did not stop and that the "conflict could spread outside the Balkans if there was no retreat in the interest of peace."

On top of everything, six full days have already passed from the moment when the Russian leader criticized the policy of his chief of diplomacy Andrey Kozyrev and "raised the possibility" of his dismissal, and five days since the Lower Chamber of the Russian Parliament officially estimated that the foreign minister had directly harmed Russian national interests in the Balkans and required that the pro-American "Mr. Yes" be dismissed.

In the meantime, NATO fired 13 "Tomahawk" cruise missiles at Russia's international position, and Yeltsin—instead of at least revoking the Russian signature on Resolution 836, if he does not have the courage to sign the law on the unilateral lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia—left for a two-week vacation in Sochi, where he will, among other things, "think about political help for the Serbs." For his part, Kozyrev rejected the accusations of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, proving that there was more time for the reexamining of the relations with NATO than for the president's "considerations of the policy on how to help the Serbs." Kozyrev's latest public appearance is important, since it was not only a signal that "Comrade Andrey" would not be dismissed, but also that "the official policy masked with patriotic and pro-Serbian phrases would not be changed significantly" as is being claimed by the increasingly numerous critics of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy, the policy of subjugating the Russian national interests and sovereignty to abstract general human values and the so-called international solidarity of democratic states. If we know that Yeltsin and Russia did not have to threaten NATO with "the reexamination of relations," since it put itself in a position in which it started an action that will not be successful, we must automatically ask why Kremlin decided to take such a risk.

We must wait for the results of Yeltsin's meditation in Sochi and the announced "reexamination" of the relations with NATO; in other words we must wait for something to happen that has not happened in the last five or six days. It can, however, be claimed, even now, that the Russian political, military, and diplomatic leadership badly underestimates two circumstances: That a weak Russia with a stable pro-Western regime is one of the United States' long-term priorities and that the cruise missiles fired at Banja Luka were, to a large degree, aimed at Moscow. It can also be concluded that the present NATO missile action in Bosnia is a more dangerous and far-reaching move than the threat of lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims, which Moscow tacitly linked to a possible unilateral Russian lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Singing in the Woods

Since the ultimate goal of the strikes against the Serb Republic is a far-reaching change in the balance of power in the Balkans, which harms both Serbia and Russia, the unilateral lifting of the sanctions by Russia would—even if it happened immediately—be a belated and insufficient countermeasure. Therefore, if the Russian leader wants to influence the unfolding of events, he will have to use his "time for thinking" to make corrections to his foreign policy. If Yeltsin does not give up very much of what is Yeltsin's, then a possible dismissal of Kozyrev will not be of much importance.

Without such corrections, the present Russian threats to the West and NATO will boil down to a fruitless stepping up of pressure on "strategic partners," necessary in the light of the approaching election, who will keep on working on the weakening of Russia. Conditionally speaking, everything could boil down to "the singing of the scared in the woods."

In any case, Yeltsin still has the possibility of reassessing the consent he gave to Resolution 836 and to make a real test—which could also be called historic—of whether Russia will agree or disagree with the intention of the West to send 50,000 NATO soldiers to Bosnia. If the Kremlin agrees with this, the East will be wide open for the NATO, and the real result of Yeltsin's "considerations" will be the acceptance of a "weak Russia" that will not be able to help itself, the Serbs, or peace in Europe in general for a long time to come.

Milosevic Offers SPO Ministerial Posts

LD2009154395 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Sep (BETA)—Danica Draskovic, a member of the leadership of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] today denied reports of SPO members entering the Serbian Government.

We can enter the government only if there are radical changes in Serbian policy, Draskovic told BETA and added that the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] "is not prepared" for this.

"I believe that in essence the Socialists are not in favor of peace even though they say otherwise," she said and recalled that all important positions were still occupied by the same people including those who had been engaged in warmongering on TV.

There are no changes of the Serbian policy particularly in respect to the media and the Socialists are still suppressing the freedom of the press, she said.

Other SPO officials said that by entering the government the party would annul everything that it had achieved in its struggle for democracy in Serbia.

However, sources close to the Serbian Assembly have said that talks on setting up a coalition government in Serbia between these two parties "have entered the phase of consultations on ministerial posts."

The same sources have told BETA that eight ministerial posts were offered to SPO, on condition that these are not posts of ministers of police and finances. Milosevic has also agreed to discuss Serbian radio and TV and the composition of its managing board; the post of the chairman of the board has been offered to SPO.

According to the same sources, Danica Draskovic would become minister of information, Borivoje Borovic would be minister of justice and Milan Bozic would be minister of education.

It has been said that by including SPO members in the Serbian government Serbia would score a "little positive point" in the international community, while at home this would provide important backing for the implementation of the state policy after a peace agreement is signed.

A BETA source which is a supporter of such a coalition says that this is not expected to give some huge results, but still it would represent "a small, but important step" in Serbian politics.

SPO Alliance Condemned

LD2009162495 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1425 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Sep (BETA)—Spokesman for the Democratic Party [DS] Slobodan Vuksanovic has said that his party was not surprised by the decision of the president of the Serbian Assembly in response to the demand for the convening of an emergency session, "because it is quite clear that the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] is cooperating to a large extent with the ruling party."

In a statement to the BETA agency he added that because of the withdrawal of the signatures of 36 DEPOS-SPO deputies, "The session of the republican assembly, which would have been of historical importance not only for the citizens of Serbia, but also for the defense of the interests of the Serbian nation as a whole, would unfortunately not take place."

Vuksanovic recalled that the initiative to convene an emergency session was initially signed by 107 deputies of the DS, SPO, Serbian Radical Party, Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians.

He explained that at a meeting held behind closed doors the representatives of the four opposition parties accepted a compromise with the SPO and agreed that the emergency session should not discuss either the responsibility of the government, as the four parties proposed, or the consequences of the policies of individual opposition parties with regard to events in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and Republic of Serb Krajina, as the SPO was demanding.

However, the SPO was clearly not satisfied with this compromise and adopted a decision on the withdrawal of the signatures of its deputies, thereby "betraying its own party policy and aims and openly siding with the socialists," Vuksanovic added.

This points to the conclusion, Vuksanovic added that "the SPO is both formally and informally entering the government."

He stressed that last night's participation by representatives of the SPO and the Serbian Civic League in the state television program "Current Affairs," without representatives of the real opposition, was not only proof of this assertion but also evidence of the SPO abandoning the struggle "for the democratization of the information media."

DSS Leader: NATO 'Smoothed' Way for Offensive

LD2009193195 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 Sep (BETA)—Vojislav Kostunica, chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] assessed today that the aggression against western Bosnia was carried out by the combined action of NATO and the Croat-Muslim forces and accompanied by "a certain assistance, in terms of their mediation, from the UN and official Belgrade."

At a news conference Kostunica said the NATO bombing "had smoothed the way for and made possible the Croat-Muslim offensive," while the UN had "made its contribution by spreading disinformation about the fall of individual towns."

"Official Belgrade had in practical terms given a green light to the bombing and the offensive," because during these actions it was negotiating with mediator Holbrooke, Kostunica believes.

According to him, Belgrade ought at that moment to have improved the position of the Serbs in the Bosnian Serb Republic by "freezing all negotiations" on the suspension of the aggression and lifting the blockade along the Drina. [passage omitted]

Minister Says Agrarian Budget Set at $450 Million

LD2009105495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1016 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Leskovac, Sept 20 (TANJUG)—Serbian Agriculture Minister Ivko Djonovic said Serbia was preparing stimulative measures to develop agriculture by introducing an agrarian budget amounting to 450 U.S. million dollars at least.

Djonovic said this in the Serbian town of Leskovac, opening the 15th international fair of wines, liquor, foodstuffs and agricultural equipment and the 15th international fair of milk, equipment and packaging for the milk industry. He said the measures were aimed at creating legal conditions for the development of agriculture and ensuring permanent and stable fund sources intended to stimulate the development of agricultural production.

'We expect our agriculture to become part of international economic trends as soon as the sanctions are lifted,' said Djonovic. He said a strategy of long-term development for agriculture which envisaged eliminating all limitations and creating conditions for the development of economically strong private farms with full affirmation of private initiative and entrepreneurship was being prepared.

About 115 exhibitors will be displaying their products until Sept. 22 on some 3,500 square meters.

Farmers Union Protests Taxes, Threatens Blockade

AU2009204695 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 8

[Article by T.O.: "Farmers Will Block Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the agreement that was reached with the representatives of the republican government, the Independent Trade Union of Farmers of Serbia has learned that farmers in Vojvodina are being forced to settle their tax bills.

"In the course of the next few days, we will send a protest note to the government over this kind of pillaging of farmers. If this does not stop, we will hold demonstrations in 10 days. This time we will be prepared to block Belgrade," said Djordje Garabandic, head of Independent Trade Union of Farmers of Serbia, especially for NASA BORBA.

"The government has not done anything to make farmers financially solvent. We are paying taxes on unrealized income. This year, farmers have constantly been losing money and there is no logic in making them pay taxes, in forcing them to pay taxes. Because of that, and because of the harassment of farmers by tax authorities, we will send a protest note to the government," Garabandic said.

Montenegro

Croats Distributing Obituaries to Serb Krajina

AU1909153795 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 95 p 6

[Article by R.M.: "Celebrating Serb Exodus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boka Kotorska—Citizens of Serbian nationality and certain institutions, including humanitarian organizations in Boka Kotorska, have been inundated these days by printed obituaries dedicated to the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The obituaries say, among other things, that the Republic of Serbian Krajina "was created in 1990 and died on 4 August 1995."

Listed as mourning over the death of the Republic of Serbian Krajina are Milan Martic, Milan Babic, Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic, former French President Francois Mitterrand, and others. This ustasha pamphlet is being sent to Serbs and Serb organizations through the mail. The Association of Serb Sisters

[Kolo srpskih sestara] in Tivat, led by Vanja Djurovic-Samardzic, received one of these obituaries by mail from Kotor.

The fall of Knin was celebrated in Tivat and Kotor areas with the population of Croatian nationality. They sang ustasha songs, particularly "Our Glorious Homeland" [Croatian national anthem]; they fired off guns; the Croatian flag was flaunted; there was a lot of drinking and loud playing of ustasha music; and the bells in the Catholic Church could be heard tolling.

Kosovo

Serb Plans for Settling Refugees in Province

AU1909134595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 18 Sep 95

[Telephone report by Ramadan Mucolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports on the plans for setting up Serbian colonies in Prishtina [Pristina] and in several places in the suburbs of the Kosova capital are accompanied by similar reports from elsewhere.

Referring to the Serbian mass media, the Kosova Information Center reports that there are also plans to set up new Serbian colonies in Ferizaj [Urosevac] Commune. Reports confirm that the Serbian violent administrators in this commune have defined 500 hectares of land from Serbian-administered agricultural enterprises and several locations to set up colonies. According to the plan, 60 buildings for colonists will be organized in the villages of Babush, Kostime, Nerodime e Poshtme, and Tankusic. The same sources report that some 25 empty houses have been observed in this commune, which can serve to accommodate the colonists. However, it has not been determined who the owners of these houses are, Albanians or Serbs.

Meanwhile, reports from Mitrovica note that the majority of the Serbian colonists in this commune have been accommodated in various public buildings, but also in the houses and huts of the dismissed Albanian workers. It is also reported that, for a part of the colonists, jobs have been ensured in several enterprises in this commune.

Lately, there have been reports of ever more frequent provocations by the colonists. The Kosova Information Center reports that, without asking anyone, the colonists have been taking foodstuffs from the Mother Teresa Humanitarian Association branch in Peje [Pec]. It is also reported that in the Dardania Hotel in the same city, several colonists beat up two Albanians, who were obliged to seek medical assistance. Cases like this show that the Serbian colonists, many of whom were active participants in the war in Croatia, can cause serious provocations that could have unpredictable consequences.

Classrooms Commandeered for Colonist Children

AU1609144195 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 13 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian installed local authorities in Lipjan [Lipljan] went to "Jeronim De Rada" Primary School at Magure village yesterday and ordered the school authorities to vacate three classrooms for 15 children of Serb colonists. The school principal told the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] Information Commission that they were facing very difficult conditions as they were working in two shifts. He added that if the three classrooms were to be given to the Serbs, the Albanian children would have to face extremely difficult conditions and would be overcrowded. The Serbian installed authorities said they would also take over the telephone line.

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